Detecting exposed secrets files

Skill jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills/plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-exposed-secrets-files

425 plugins, 2,810 skills, 200 agents for Claude Code. Open-source marketplace at tonsofskills.com with the ccpi CLI package manager.

Install

npx -y skills add jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins-plus-skills --skill detecting-exposed-secrets-files

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

What its author says it does

Copied from the file, not written here

Probe a target for accidentally-served secret-bearing files in the web root — `.git/`, `.env`, `.DS_Store`, backup files, database dumps, key files, CI configs, IDE configs. Use when: post-deploy verification on a new release, or SOC2 auditor asked "what's reachable in the web root that shouldn't be," or a bug-bounty report hints at a leaked file. Threshold: any of the canonical 40+ paths returns 200 OR returns a body matching the expected fingerprint of the file type (e.g., `.git/HEAD` returns content starting with `ref:` or a 40-char hex SHA). Trigger with: "check exposed files", "git directory exposure", "env file leak", "backup file scan".

The file declares its own license as MIT. That is the author’s claim about this one file, and it is not the same thing as the license GitHub reports for the repository, which is listed with the other numbers below.

SKILL.md

6.6 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

Detecting Exposed Secrets Files

Overview

The single highest-value pentest probe per HTTP request. A .git/config disclosure leaks repo URL + credentials embedded in remote URLs. A .env disclosure leaks every API key the app has. A backup.sql disclosure leaks the entire database. These are not "weak crypto" findings that need a chained exploit. They are direct, immediate compromise.

The probe set is the canonical 40+ paths web servers commonly expose by accident: VCS directories (.git/, .svn/, .hg/), dotenv files, OS metadata (.DS_Store), database dumps, archive files, IDE configs, CI configs, and key files. Each is fingerprinted to distinguish a true positive (server returns the file's expected content) from a 200 OK that's actually the application's SPA index page catching the route.

When the skill produces findings

Finding	Severity	Threshold	Affected control
`.git/HEAD` reachable + valid content	CRITICAL	200 + body matches `ref:` or 40-char SHA	NIST 800-53 SC-28
`.git/config` reachable + repo URL leaked	CRITICAL	200 + body matches `[remote`	NIST 800-53 SC-28
`.env` reachable + dotenv format	CRITICAL	200 + body matches `KEY=VALUE` lines	OWASP A05:2021
`.sql` / `.dump` / `backup.*` reachable	CRITICAL	200 + body looks like SQL or binary dump	CWE-538
`.aws/credentials` reachable	CRITICAL	200 + body matches `[default]\naws_access_key_id`	CWE-200
`id_rsa` / `.pem` / `.key` reachable	CRITICAL	200 + body matches `BEGIN PRIVATE KEY` or `BEGIN RSA`	CWE-321
`.svn/entries` / `.hg/store/` reachable	HIGH	200 + body matches VCS format	NIST 800-53 SC-28
`.DS_Store` reachable	MEDIUM	200 + binary blob with `Bud1` magic	CWE-538
IDE configs (`.idea/`, `.vscode/`) reachable	LOW	200 + JSON/XML	CWE-200
`composer.json` / `package.json` reachable on prod	LOW	200 + valid JSON in non-API root	CWE-200

Prerequisites

Python 3.9+ with requests library
Authorization for non-local targets

Instructions

Step 1 — Confirm Authorization

"Do you have authorization to perform secret-file discovery on this
 target? I need confirmation before proceeding."

Step 2 — Run the scanner

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-exposed-secrets-files/scripts/probe_secrets.py \
    https://target.example.com \
    --authorized

Options:

Usage: probe_secrets.py URL [OPTIONS]

Options:
  --authorized       Attest authorization (required for non-local)
  --output FILE      Write findings to FILE
  --format FMT       json | jsonl | markdown (default: markdown)
  --min-severity SEV (default: info)
  --timeout SECS     Per-probe timeout (default: 10)
  --paths-file FILE  Override the canonical probe set with a custom list
  --check-only       Skip body-fingerprint verification (faster, more
                     false positives — useful when target serves SPA
                     index for everything)

The scanner sends a GET for each path in the canonical probe set. For every 200 response, it inspects the body to confirm the response really is the expected file type (not the app's SPA index catching the route).

Step 3 — Interpret findings

CRITICAL = direct credential / source code / database exposure. Ship same-hour fix (configure web server to deny + audit logs for anyone who already exfiltrated).

Step 4 — Cross-skill chaining

After this skill, suggest detecting-debug-endpoints (#7) — the same deploy mistake that exposes .git/ often exposes /admin/ and /server-status/. And detecting-directory-listing (#9) — if any of the secret-file paths returned a directory listing instead of the file itself, autoindex is enabled.

Examples

Example 1 — Post-deploy verification

User: "We just rolled out v4.2. Make sure we didn't deploy .env or the .git/ dir by accident."

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-exposed-secrets-files/scripts/probe_secrets.py \
    https://app.example.com --authorized --min-severity high

Example 2 — Bug bounty triage

User: "Submission claims our .git/ is exposed."

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-exposed-secrets-files/scripts/probe_secrets.py \
    https://app.example.com --authorized --format json --output exposure.json
jq '.[] | select(.title | contains(".git"))' exposure.json

The fingerprint check distinguishes real .git/HEAD (returns ref: refs/heads/main or a 40-char hex SHA) from false-positive SPA index pages that 200 on any path.

Example 3 — CI gate against future deploys

- name: Exposed-files gate
  run: |
    python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-exposed-secrets-files/scripts/probe_secrets.py \
        "${{ secrets.STAGING_URL }}" \
        --authorized --min-severity critical

Exit 1 fails the deploy if any CRITICAL finding lands.

Output

JSON / JSONL / Markdown. Exit codes: 0 clean, 1 high/critical, 2 error.

Error Handling

Target SPA-catches every URL with 200 → use --check-only to skip body-fingerprint; expect more false positives but get any real exposure.
All probes timeout → likely DDoS protection blocking the scanner; contact the target's security team for an allowlist.
Connection error → exit 2.

Resources

references/THEORY.md — Why each path matters, fingerprint patterns, RFC / OWASP / NIST anchors
references/PLAYBOOK.md — Per-server config snippets to block each category of path (nginx, Apache, Caddy, ALB, GCP LB)
../analyzing-tls-config/references/AUTHORIZATION.md — Active-scan authorization