Glean security basics
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'Token security: Indexing tokens have write access -- never expose in frontend.
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SKILL.md
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Glean Security Basics
Overview
Glean indexes and searches across an enterprise's entire knowledge base — Confluence, Google Drive, Slack, GitHub, and dozens more connectors. Security concerns center on indexing token management (write-access tokens that can push content into the search index), client token scoping (user-level search permissions), and document-level access controls. A leaked indexing token allows injecting arbitrary content into enterprise search results.
API Key Management
function createGleanClient(tokenType: "indexing" | "client"): { token: string; baseUrl: string } {
const token = tokenType === "indexing"
? process.env.GLEAN_INDEXING_TOKEN
: process.env.GLEAN_CLIENT_TOKEN;
if (!token) {
throw new Error(`Missing GLEAN_${tokenType.toUpperCase()}_TOKEN — store in secrets manager`);
}
// Indexing tokens have WRITE access — never expose in frontend code
if (tokenType === "indexing") {
console.log("WARNING: Indexing token loaded — backend use only");
}
return { token, baseUrl: `https://${process.env.GLEAN_INSTANCE}.glean.com/api` };
}
Webhook Signature Verification
import crypto from "crypto";
import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from "express";
function verifyGleanWebhook(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void {
const signature = req.headers["x-glean-signature"] as string;
const secret = process.env.GLEAN_WEBHOOK_SECRET!;
const expected = crypto.createHmac("sha256", secret).update(req.body).digest("hex");
if (!signature || !crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(signature), Buffer.from(expected))) {
res.status(401).send("Invalid signature");
return;
}
next();
}
Input Validation
import { z } from "zod";
const IndexDocumentSchema = z.object({
datasource: z.string().min(1).max(100),
document_id: z.string().min(1).max(500),
title: z.string().min(1).max(500),
body: z.string().max(1_000_000),
allowed_users: z.array(z.string().email()).optional(),
allowed_groups: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
permissions_type: z.enum(["public", "restricted", "private"]).default("restricted"),
});
function validateIndexDocument(data: unknown) {
return IndexDocumentSchema.parse(data);
}
Data Protection
const GLEAN_SENSITIVE_FIELDS = ["indexing_token", "client_token", "document_body", "user_query", "search_results"];
function redactGleanLog(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
const redacted = { ...record };
for (const field of GLEAN_SENSITIVE_FIELDS) {
if (field in redacted) redacted[field] = "[REDACTED]";
}
return redacted;
}
Security Checklist
- Indexing tokens stored server-side only, never in frontend code
- Client tokens scoped per-user with
X-Glean-Auth-Typeheader - Tokens rotated quarterly via Admin > API Tokens
- Document permissions set via
allowedUsers/allowedGroups - SAML SSO enforced for Glean web access
- All API calls over HTTPS
- Search audit logs enabled to track sensitive queries
- Connector permissions reviewed when adding new data sources
Error Handling
| Vulnerability | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Leaked indexing token | Arbitrary content injected into search index | Backend-only storage + rotation |
| Missing document permissions | Confidential docs exposed in search results | allowedUsers/allowedGroups on every document |
| Client token in frontend | User impersonation in search queries | Server-side proxy for search API |
| Overly broad connector scope | Sensitive repos/channels indexed unintentionally | Per-connector permission review |
| Search queries in logs | Employee activity surveillance risk | Query redaction in logging pipeline |
Resources
Next Steps
See glean-prod-checklist.