Figma security basics
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'Secure Figma API tokens, configure scopes, and validate webhook signatures.
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SKILL.md
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Figma Security Basics
Overview
Secure your Figma API integration: store tokens safely, apply least-privilege scopes, rotate credentials, and verify webhook signatures.
Prerequisites
- Figma PAT or OAuth app configured
- Understanding of environment variables
.gitignoreconfigured for secret files
Instructions
Step 1: Token Storage
# .env (NEVER commit)
FIGMA_PAT="figd_your-personal-access-token"
FIGMA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET="your-oauth-secret"
# .gitignore
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
*.pem
// Validate token exists before any API call
function getToken(): string {
const token = process.env.FIGMA_PAT;
if (!token) throw new Error('FIGMA_PAT is not set');
if (!token.startsWith('figd_')) {
console.warn('Token does not have expected figd_ prefix');
}
return token;
}
Step 2: Least-Privilege Scopes
Assign the minimum scopes needed for each use case:
| Use Case | Required Scopes |
|---|---|
| Read file structure | file_content:read |
| Export images | file_content:read |
| Post comments | file_comments:write |
| Read variables (Enterprise) | file_variables:read |
| Manage webhooks | webhooks:write |
| Read team components | team_library_content:read |
| Dev mode resources | file_dev_resources:read |
Deprecated scope: files:read is deprecated. Use specific scopes like file_content:read, file_comments:read instead.
Step 3: Token Rotation
# PATs have a maximum 90-day lifetime
# Schedule rotation before expiry
# 1. Generate new token in Figma Settings > Personal access tokens
# 2. Test new token
curl -s -H "X-Figma-Token: ${NEW_TOKEN}" \
https://api.figma.com/v1/me | jq '.handle'
# 3. Update environment
# For CI: gh secret set FIGMA_PAT --body "${NEW_TOKEN}"
# For production: update your secret manager
# 4. Verify old token is revoked in Figma Settings
Step 4: Webhook Passcode Verification
Figma webhooks use a passcode field (not HMAC signatures) for verification:
// When creating a webhook, you provide a passcode:
// POST /v2/webhooks
// { "event_type": "FILE_UPDATE", "team_id": "...", "endpoint": "...", "passcode": "my-secret" }
// Figma sends the passcode back in the webhook payload body
interface FigmaWebhookPayload {
event_type: string;
passcode: string; // Your secret, echoed back
timestamp: string;
file_key?: string;
file_name?: string;
webhook_id: string;
}
function verifyFigmaWebhook(
payload: FigmaWebhookPayload,
expectedPasscode: string
): boolean {
// Timing-safe comparison to prevent timing attacks
if (payload.passcode.length !== expectedPasscode.length) return false;
const a = Buffer.from(payload.passcode);
const b = Buffer.from(expectedPasscode);
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b);
}
// Express handler
app.post('/webhooks/figma', express.json(), (req, res) => {
const payload: FigmaWebhookPayload = req.body;
if (!verifyFigmaWebhook(payload, process.env.FIGMA_WEBHOOK_PASSCODE!)) {
console.warn('Invalid webhook passcode');
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid passcode' });
}
// Process the event
handleFigmaEvent(payload);
res.status(200).json({ received: true });
});
Step 5: Security Checklist
- [ ] PAT stored in environment variable, not in code
- [ ] `.env` files listed in `.gitignore`
- [ ] Token uses minimum required scopes
- [ ] Token rotation scheduled before 90-day expiry
- [ ] Webhook passcode verified on every incoming request
- [ ] OAuth client secret stored in secret manager (not repo)
- [ ] No tokens in frontend/client-side code
- [ ] Git history scanned for leaked tokens (use `git log -p | grep figd_`)
- [ ] Different tokens for dev/staging/prod environments
Output
- Secure token storage configured
- Minimum-privilege scopes applied
- Webhook passcode verification implemented
- Rotation schedule documented
Error Handling
| Security Issue | Detection | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Token in git history | git log -p | grep figd_ | Revoke immediately, rotate, use BFG Repo Cleaner |
| Expired PAT | 403 errors in production | Set calendar reminder for 80-day mark |
| Over-scoped token | Audit in Figma Settings | Regenerate with minimum scopes |
| Webhook spoofing | Missing passcode check | Always verify passcode before processing |
Examples
Verify a token is valid and see who it acts as, without exposing it in shell history (Step 1 storage + /v1/me probe):
FIGMA_PAT=$(security find-generic-password -s figma-pat -w 2>/dev/null || pass show figma/pat)
curl -s -H "X-Figma-Token: ${FIGMA_PAT}" https://api.figma.com/v1/me | jq '{id, email, handle}'
Reject a forged webhook delivery (Step 4 passcode verification):
curl -s -X POST localhost:3000/figma/webhook \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"event_type":"FILE_UPDATE","passcode":"wrong"}'
# 401 {"error":"invalid passcode"}
Rotation runbook and the full checklist: references/token-rotation.md, references/security-checklist.md.
Resources
Next Steps
For production deployment, see figma-prod-checklist.