Forge security

forge-security: Application security

Purpose

Perform a threat-informed audit of trust boundaries, injection, secrets, browser controls, dependencies, and abuse cases.

This is an agent playbook, not a claim of standalone analyzer coverage. Apply

fullstack-forge/references/shared/module-contract.md

for common applicability, evidence, command-safety, mutation, verification, and completion rules.

Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.

Automatic activation signals

Activate when a request or direct repository evidence involves application security, when the user explicitly names forge-security, or when discovery proves an applicable boundary.

• Every production-bound application
• Security-sensitive changes

When not to activate

• No exemption; scope may be reduced for non-executable documentation

Automated support

Relevant discovery inputs are:

• project and architecture profile
• trust boundaries
• dependency and secret scan outputs

Available deterministic support, where present:

• Use scan-secret-patterns for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Use inspect-routes for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Use inspect-auth-boundaries for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Use inspect-authorization for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Use inspect-dependencies for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.

Agent inspection procedure

1. Model the attack surface from discovery: entry points, trust boundaries, secrets, and the assets behind each.
2. Trace untrusted input from every entry point to execution sinks (SQL, shell, template, deserialization, HTTP clients, file paths), recording interpolation versus binding at each sink.
3. Inspect browser-boundary controls: output encoding, CSRF protection, CORS policy, security headers, and cookie flags on the actual responses.
4. Search for secrets in code, configuration, templates, and history; verify error responses and logs do not leak internals or sensitive data.
5. Run available dependency, static, and secret scanners, separating confirmed findings from pattern matches, and check rate limiting and abuse controls on expensive or state-changing operations.

Manual inspection requirements:

• Review business-logic abuse and chained attack paths
• Validate production-only controls with operators

Stack-specific guidance:

• Use framework-native escaping and query parameterization at the final sink

Evidence to collect

For formal findings, also follow fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md. Record the module's inspected boundary, relevant tests, direct observations, and unavailable evidence.

Primary standards used as criteria, not proof of compliance:

• OWASP ASVS 5.0
• OWASP Cheat Sheet Series
• NIST SSDF

Common production failures

• Model assets, actors, entry points, trust boundaries, abuse cases, and mitigations
• Inspect injection, XSS, CSRF, SSRF, deserialization, path handling, redirects, headers, CORS, secrets, logging, and denial-of-service limits
• Run available dependency, static, and secret checks while distinguishing confirmed evidence from pattern matches

Missing-control checks

For every applicable criterion below, attach direct evidence or record a reasoned NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_VERIFIED, or BLOCKED status. The list is a routing checklist, not evidence by itself.

• SQL injection
• NoSQL injection
• OS command injection
• Template injection
• Expression-language injection
• Header injection
• CRLF injection
• Log injection
• CSV and formula injection
• HTML injection
• JavaScript injection
• Cross-site scripting
• CSRF
• SSRF
• Path traversal
• Unsafe redirects
• Unsafe deserialization
• Request smuggling risks
• CORS
• Security headers
• Secret exposure
• Weak cryptography
• Hard-coded credentials
• Sensitive logging
• Error leakage
• Rate limiting
• Denial-of-service exposure
• Business-logic abuse
• Authentication weaknesses
• Authorization weaknesses
• Admin endpoints
• Debug endpoints
• Internal endpoints
• Dependency risks
• Prompt injection
• Unsafe shell execution
• Race conditions
• Mass assignment
• Prototype pollution
• ReDoS
• Session attacks
• OWASP ASVS, OWASP API Security, and NIST SSDF evidence

Commands and tools

• Run forge security audit --json or fullstack-forge security audit --json when an explicit audit is requested and the CLI is installed. Normal feature work does not require it.
• Use the deterministic support named above only for its documented bounded evidence.

Safe fixes

• Parameterize known trust-boundary inputs, redact secrets, and add straightforward security headers
• Add allowlists and explicit size limits

Approval-required changes

• Disabling controls, rotating secrets, or changing authentication, network, or production infrastructure

Verification

• Re-run scanners and targeted exploit regression tests
• Confirm every PASS has direct evidence

Completion contract

Apply the shared module contract and the module-specific limitations below.

Known limitations

• This audit is not a penetration test and must not be represented as one