Threat model discipline
Skill hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/skills/threat-model-discipline
Offensive security toolkit for Claude Code covering red team, exploit dev, AD attacks, EDR bypass, mobile pentest
npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill threat-model-disciplineAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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Use when starting an engagement, before exploitation, or whenever the attack surface changes — build/validate the threat model and detect drift (new unreviewed surface) before advancing
SKILL.md
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Threat-Model Discipline
Overview
You cannot test what you have not modeled. A threat model names the assets, entry points, trust boundaries, relevant ATT&CK techniques, and existing mitigations — so coverage is deliberate, not accidental. On a long engagement the surface drifts (a new endpoint, a new dependency); un-reviewed drift is where bugs hide. This skill keeps the model complete and re-checks it for drift.
When to Activate
- At engagement start (after recon-osint), before weaponize/exploit.
- Whenever recon is re-run or the target changes — to catch new attack surface.
- At
/engage.gate— the gate refuses to advance on un-acknowledged drift.
The model (JSON, materialized from recon)
threat-model.json (see templates/threat-model/): five required lists —
assets, entry_points, trust_boundaries, attck (technique ids), mitigations.
# 1. Lint - every required field present, no placeholders, valid ATT&CK ids
python skills/threat-model-discipline/scripts/threatmodel_lint.py lint .engage/recon/threat-model.json
# 2. Drift - diff a re-run against the reviewed baseline; NEW entry points/assets/boundaries are
# unreviewed surface and BLOCK the gate until re-reviewed or acknowledged
python skills/threat-model-discipline/scripts/threatmodel_lint.py drift \
.engage/recon/threat-model.baseline.json .engage/recon/threat-model.json
Or use /engage.threatmodel (materialize | lint | drift).
Red Flags — STOP
- "We'll model it as we go" — unmodeled surface = untested surface. Model first.
- "Recon changed but the threat model didn't" — re-run drift; new surface must be re-reviewed.
- A threat model full of
TBD/[fill in]— that is not a model; the lint fails it. - A new
entry_pointappeared and you proceeded anyway — that is the exact gap attackers use.
Rationalizations
| Excuse | Reality |
|---|---|
| "The model is obvious, skip it" | Obvious to you ≠ documented. Coverage you can't diff is coverage you can't trust. |
| "Drift is just noise" | A new entry point is new attack surface. Acknowledge it explicitly or re-review. |
| "ATT&CK mapping is busywork" | It turns 'we tested stuff' into 'we covered these techniques' — the report's backbone. |
Pairs with scope-discipline (what you may touch) and finding-discipline (what counts as proven).