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Mobile pentest

Skill hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/skills/mobile-pentest

Offensive security toolkit for Claude Code covering red team, exploit dev, AD attacks, EDR bypass, mobile pentest

Install
npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill mobile-pentest

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

What its author says it does

Copied from the file, not written here

Use when pentesting an Android/iOS app — Frida 17 instrumentation, SSL-pinning & root/jailbreak bypass, Android 14/15 CA injection, exported-component/content-provider abuse, deep-link/WebView chains, biometric bypass, Flutter/React-Native RE

SKILL.md

10.7 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

Mobile Application Penetration Testing

When to Activate

  • Android/iOS application security assessment, bug-bounty mobile triage, or app-store reconnaissance
  • Need to intercept TLS traffic (SSL/cert pinning, Android 14/15 Conscrypt-APEX trust store, Flutter/RN stacks)
  • Bypass root/jailbreak or biometric-gating controls during dynamic analysis
  • Enumerate and exploit exported components, content providers, deep links, and WebViews
  • Extract secrets from insecure storage (SharedPrefs, SQLite, Keychain, Keystore) and reverse hybrid apps

Technique Map

TechniqueATT&CKCWEReferenceScript
Lab build + Frida 17 server/gadgetT1635CWE-1188references/environment-interception.md-
Android 14/15 Conscrypt-APEX CA injectionT1521.001CWE-295references/environment-interception.mdscripts/android_ca_inject.sh
SSL/cert-pinning bypass (Java TM/OkHttp/native)T1521.001CWE-295references/environment-interception.mdscripts/universal_unpin.js
Root detection bypass (RootBeer/native stat)T1633.001CWE-693references/environment-interception.mdscripts/universal_unpin.js
Exported activity/service/receiver abuseT1626.001CWE-926references/android-component-attacks.mdscripts/manifest_attack_surface.py
Content-provider SQLi / path traversal (CVE-2025-48609)T1409CWE-22, CWE-89references/android-component-attacks.mdscripts/component_fuzz.sh
Task hijacking / StrandHogg / TapTrap (USENIX '25)T1517CWE-1021references/android-component-attacks.mdscripts/manifest_attack_surface.py
Deep-link / intent-redirect / scheme hijackT1635, T1577CWE-939references/webview-deeplink-exploitation.mdscripts/component_fuzz.sh
WebView JS-interface RCE + file:// theftT1577CWE-749references/webview-deeplink-exploitation.mdscripts/component_fuzz.sh
OAuth custom-scheme callback interceptionT1635CWE-940references/webview-deeplink-exploitation.md-
Insecure storage (SharedPrefs/SQLite/external)T1409CWE-312references/insecure-storage-crypto.mdscripts/manifest_attack_surface.py
Keystore/Keychain misuse + dumpingT1634CWE-522references/insecure-storage-crypto.mdscripts/ios_bypass_suite.js
Biometric bypass (BiometricPrompt/LAContext)T1634CWE-287references/insecure-storage-crypto.mdscripts/ios_bypass_suite.js
iOS jailbreak + JB-detection bypassT1635CWE-693references/ios-offensive.mdscripts/ios_bypass_suite.js
IPA decrypt / class-dump / URL-scheme abuseT1409, T1635CWE-200references/ios-offensive.mdscripts/ios_bypass_suite.js
Flutter RE / reFlutter pinning bypassT1521.001CWE-295references/crossplatform-re-instrumentation.mdscripts/hermes_triage.py
React Native Hermes bytecode decompileT1640CWE-656references/crossplatform-re-instrumentation.mdscripts/hermes_triage.py

Quick Start

# ---- ANDROID ----
# 0. Pull + statically triage the APK (manifest, secrets, exported surface, framework ID)
adb shell pm path com.target.app                              # locate split APKs
adb pull /data/app/.../base.apk .
python3 scripts/manifest_attack_surface.py base.apk -o surface.json
jadx -d src base.apk &  apktool d base.apk -o decoded

# 1. Frida 17: match server to host tools; push + run
frida --version                                              # e.g. 17.x  -> use matching server
adb push frida-server-17.x-android-arm64 /data/local/tmp/frida-server
adb shell "su -c 'chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/frida-server && /data/local/tmp/frida-server &'"

# 2. Trust Burp CA on Android 14/15 (APEX is immutable -> Zygote namespace bind-mount)
bash scripts/android_ca_inject.sh 9a5ba575.0 cacert.pem      # see reference for cert hashing

# 3. Spawn target with universal unpinning + root-detection bypass
frida -U -f com.target.app -l scripts/universal_unpin.js --no-pause

# 4. Hit the exported attack surface from surface.json
bash scripts/component_fuzz.sh com.target.app surface.json

# ---- iOS ----
frida-ios-dump -o app.ipa com.target.app                     # decrypt + pull (jailbroken)
frida -U -f com.target.app -l scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js --no-pause   # JB + pinning + biometric + keychain

# ---- HYBRID ----
file decoded/assets/index.android.bundle                     # "Hermes JavaScript bytecode" => RN
python3 scripts/hermes_triage.py base.apk                    # detect Flutter/RN, drive reFlutter/hermes-dec

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

TechniqueTelemetry / IOCDetection (Sigma / app-side)OPSEC note
Frida instrumentationfrida-server/gadget ports (27042), re.frida.server, suspicious maps regions, named pipes linjectorApp scans /proc/self/maps for frida, checks D-Bus port, thread gum-js-loop; Play IntegrityUse frida-gadget renamed lib, custom port frida-server -l 0.0.0.0:1337, magisk-hide / Shamiko
CA injection (APEX)New trust anchor in process trust store; cert CN mismatch on pinned hostsNetwork Security Config <trust-anchors> excludes user store; pinning catches itMount lives only in Zygote ns, vanishes on Zygote crash — re-inject; nothing written to /system
SSL-pinning bypassTLS handshake to proxy IP; cert chain not app-pinned certApp-side pin failure callbacks fire (if logged); telemetry SDK sees proxy certHook before first request; for Flutter prefer reFlutter patch over runtime to avoid crash loops
Root/JB bypassgetprop ro.debuggable, su binaries, magisk paths queriedRootBeer/iXGuard SDK reports; SafetyNet/Play Integrity attestation server-sideBypass client checks only; server-side attestation (Play Integrity / DeviceCheck) is unaffected
Exported component abuseam start/startservice/broadcast from adb; foreign UID intentApp logs unexpected caller UID; Binder.getCallingUid() checksUse on-device malicious app for realism; adb leaves shell history
Content-provider traversalcontent query with ../; openFile on out-of-dir pathFileProvider canonical-path check; CVE-2025-48609 patched Mar 2026 SPLURL-encode ..%2f to dodge naive filters; read-only first
TapTrap / task hijackTransparent activity transition, taskAffinity overlap, animationScale abuseTapTrap fixed Dec 2025 SPL; check targetSdk, taskAffinity=""Zero-permission; works <Dec-2025 patch; user study: 100% missed at least one variant
Keychain/Keystore dumpkeychain_dumper, frida memory scrape, SecItemCopyMatching hooksKeychain items with .biometryCurrentSet resist hooking; SE-backed keys unextractableJB device dumps keychain plaintext regardless of ACL; flag SE vs SW keys in report
Biometric bypassLAContext evaluatePolicy / BiometricPrompt callback hookOnly works on boolean-result pattern, NOT SecAccessControl-gated cryptoReport root cause: auth result not bound to a crypto/keychain operation

Deep Dives

  • references/environment-interception.md — Rooted/jailbroken lab, Genymotion/AVD, Magisk+Shamiko, Frida 17 breaking changes (bridge removal, frida-pm, frida-compile), gadget mode for non-root, Android 14/15 Conscrypt-APEX CA injection via Zygote namespace bind-mount, universal SSL-pinning bypass (Java TrustManager/OkHttp/Network Security Config/native BoringSSL), root-detection bypass.
  • references/android-component-attacks.md — Manifest attack-surface enumeration, exported activity/service/broadcast/provider exploitation, content-provider SQLi & path traversal (CVE-2025-48609 MmsProvider), intent:// redirection to non-exported components, task hijacking (StrandHogg 1.0/2.0 CVE-2020-0096) and TapTrap animation-driven tapjacking (USENIX Security '25), drozer + adb workflows.
  • references/webview-deeplink-exploitation.mdaddJavascriptInterface RCE, setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs/file:// local-file theft, deep-link → WebView open-redirect/XSS chains, intent:// browsable-activity pivots, OAuth custom-scheme callback hijack (RFC 8252), iOS URL-scheme & Universal Link abuse, one-click browser-to-WebView exploitation.
  • references/insecure-storage-crypto.md — Android SharedPreferences/SQLite/internal+external storage, Android Keystore misuse (non-hardware-backed keys, no setUserAuthenticationRequired), iOS Keychain ACLs & keychain_dumper, NSUserDefaults/plist leaks, biometric bypass (BiometricPrompt CryptoObject vs result-only, LAContext evaluatePolicy), hardcoded secrets & Firebase/S3 misconfig, MASVS-STORAGE mapping.
  • references/ios-offensive.md — Jailbreak tooling matrix (palera1n checkm8 A8–A11/T2 iOS 15–18.x, Dopamine A8–A16 iOS 15–16.6.1, Dopamine HideJailbreak), JB-detection bypass (Frida stat/fopen/dlopen hooks + Shadow), IPA decryption (frida-ios-dump/bagbak), class-dump/Swift demangling, entitlements & URL-scheme analysis, Frida-version pinning gotchas.
  • references/crossplatform-re-instrumentation.md — Flutter Dart-stack interception (reFlutter libflutter.so patch of ssl_crypto_x509_session_verify_cert_chain, iptables/proxydroid fallback), React Native Hermes bytecode RE (hermes-dec, hbctool patch/reassemble, hermes-decomp, CatalystInstanceImpl.loadScriptFromAssets Frida hook), native .so JNI/JNI_OnLoad analysis in Ghidra/IDA.

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