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Exploit development

Skill hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/skills/exploit-development

Offensive security toolkit for Claude Code covering red team, exploit dev, AD attacks, EDR bypass, mobile pentest

Install
npx -y skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill exploit-development

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

What its author says it does

Copied from the file, not written here

Use when turning a memory-corruption bug into a working PoC — stack/ROP, glibc heap & FSOP, format strings, browser/JIT type confusion & UAF, Linux/Windows kernel LPE against ASLR/DEP/CFG/CET/V8-Sandbox

SKILL.md

9.1 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

Exploit Development

End-to-end weaponization: turn a confirmed bug class into a reliable, version-pinned PoC, then a primitive chain (leak -> R/W -> control flow), against current mitigations. Every cluster pairs the offensive path with detection telemetry and OPSEC.

When to Activate

  • A confirmed vulnerability needs a working, reliable PoC (>=90% success target).
  • Userland binary exploitation: stack overflow, heap (UAF/overflow/double-free), format string.
  • Defeating modern mitigations: ASLR/PIE, NX/DEP, stack canaries, Full RELRO, CFG, Intel CET shadow stack, V8 Sandbox/pointer compression.
  • Browser/JIT engine exploitation (V8 type confusion, addrof/fakeobj, WASM jump-table pivot).
  • Local privilege escalation via Linux/Windows kernel memory corruption.
  • Converting a crash into a stable read/write/execute primitive chain.

Technique Map

TechniqueATT&CKCWEReferenceScript
Stack overflow -> ret2libc/ROPT1203CWE-121references/stack-rop-mitigations.mdscripts/offset_finder.py
ret2csu / SROP / stack pivotT1203CWE-121references/stack-rop-mitigations.mdscripts/rop_autochain.py
ret2dlresolve (leakless)T1203CWE-121references/stack-rop-mitigations.mdscripts/rop_autochain.py
CET/CFG-aware control-flow hijackT1203CWE-1419references/stack-rop-mitigations.mdscripts/rop_autochain.py
tcache/fastbin poisoning + safe-linkingT1203CWE-416references/heap-glibc-fsop.mdscripts/safe_linking.py
House of Botcake / Einherjar / Apple2T1203CWE-415references/heap-glibc-fsop.mdscripts/heap_fsop.py
FSOP (stdout leak, House of Apple 2)T1203CWE-787references/heap-glibc-fsop.mdscripts/heap_fsop.py
Format string leak + arbitrary writeT1203CWE-134references/format-string-leaks.mdscripts/fmtstr_leak.py
V8 type confusion -> addrof/fakeobjT1203CWE-843references/browser-jit-uaf.mdscripts/v8_primitives.js
V8 Sandbox escape (WASM jump table)T1203CWE-843references/browser-jit-uaf.mdscripts/v8_primitives.js
UAF heap-spray reclaimT1203CWE-416references/browser-jit-uaf.mdscripts/v8_primitives.js
Linux kernel UAF -> cross-cacheT1068CWE-416references/kernel-exploitation.mdscripts/kernel_lpe_skeleton.c
Dirty Pagetable / PagedirectoryT1068CWE-416references/kernel-exploitation.mdscripts/kernel_lpe_skeleton.c
msg_msg infoleak / sprayT1068CWE-125references/kernel-exploitation.mdscripts/kernel_lpe_skeleton.c
Windows PreviousMode / I/O Ring R/WT1068CWE-787references/kernel-exploitation.mdscripts/kernel_lpe_skeleton.c
Empirical mitigation matrix (build witness under N profiles)T1203CWE-693references/exploit-feasibility.mdscripts/feasibility_profile.py
Cached context + blocked-technique gate for /exploitT1203CWE-693references/exploit-feasibility.mdscripts/exploit_context.py

Quick Start

# 0. Fingerprint target + libc (pin every version)
file ./target; pwn checksec ./target
strings -a libc.so.6 | grep -m1 'release version'   # exact glibc build
patchelf --set-interpreter ./ld.so --replace-needed libc.so.6 ./libc.so.6 ./target

# 1. Crash + offset (cyclic) — see scripts/offset_finder.py
python3 scripts/offset_finder.py ./target            # auto pattern_create/offset

# 2. Gadgets + one_gadget
ROPgadget --binary ./libc.so.6 > gadgets.txt
ropper -f ./libc.so.6 --search 'pop rdi; ret'
one_gadget ./libc.so.6

# 3. Build chain (leak -> base -> system/execve) — scripts/rop_autochain.py
python3 scripts/rop_autochain.py ./target ./libc.so.6 --leak puts --remote host:port

# 4. Heap targets: poison fd with safe-linking math, FSOP for the endgame
python3 scripts/safe_linking.py --chunk 0x55...000 --target 0x7f...   # encrypt fd
python3 scripts/heap_fsop.py --libc ./libc.so.6 --mode apple2         # FSOP payload

# 5. Verify reliability before delivery
for i in $(seq 1 50); do python3 exploit.py >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo ok; done | wc -l

Cache the target context once. Steps 0–2 (file/checksec/libc build, gadget table, one_gadget) describe the target, not a single attempt — compute them once and reuse them across every PoC iteration. Re-running recon on each attempt wastes budget and pollutes telemetry; an autopilot loop should treat the fingerprint + gadget set as cached input, not a per-iteration step. A future empirical feasibility profile (raptor-adoption PR-3) will rebuild the crash witness under several mitigation profiles and emit a machine-readable map of which techniques the target actually permits — the PoC is then forbidden from using a technique that map marks blocked. Until it lands: record the checksec/mitigation state explicitly and do not claim a technique the target's protections rule out.

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

TechniqueTelemetry/IOCDetection (Sigma/EDR)OPSEC note
ROP/ret2libcStack exec faults, abnormal execve("/bin/sh") child of network daemonEDR: child shell from listener; auditd execve of /bin/sh w/ empty argvUse in-memory ORW (open/read/write flag) instead of shell to avoid execve IOC
Heap/FSOPglibc *** stack smashing ***/malloc(): ... aborts in logs; SIGABRT crash loopsSigma: repeated SIGABRT/SIGSEGV from same PID; coredump burstsDisable coredumps (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE,0)); tune spray to avoid abort()s
Format string%n/%p strings in request/argv logs; segfault on bad writeWAF/Sigma on %n,%[0-9]+\$n in inputsPre-stage write target; minimize % count, avoid huge field widths
V8 type confusionRenderer crash dumps, chrome_crashpad, GPU/renderer restartsCrashpad telemetry; EDR on renderer spawning unexpected processesKeep corruption inside cage; clean up sprayed arrays; avoid renderer crash on failure
Kernel LPEdmesg oops/RIP, KASAN splats, apparmor/audit LPE child = rootSigma: process gaining uid=0 w/o setuid path; EDR kernel-callbackFileless (no SUID drop); restore corrupted state; clear dmesg only if authorized

Deep Dives

  • references/stack-rop-mitigations.md — Stack overflow, ret2libc/ROP, ret2csu, SROP, stack pivots, ret2dlresolve; defeating ASLR/PIE/NX/canary/RELRO and CET shadow stack / CFG-aware constraints. Backed by offset_finder.py, rop_autochain.py.
  • references/heap-glibc-fsop.md — glibc 2.35-2.40 internals, tcache/fastbin poisoning under safe-linking, House of Botcake/Einherjar/Apple 2/Tangerine, stdout FSOP leak, post-hook-removal endgames. Backed by safe_linking.py, heap_fsop.py.
  • references/format-string-leaks.md — Read/write mechanics, stack-arg indexing, %n arbitrary write, PIE/libc/canary leaks, fmtstr automation and one-shot GOT/exit-handler overwrite. Backed by fmtstr_leak.py.
  • references/browser-jit-uaf.md — V8 element-kind confusion, addrof/fakeobj, arbitrary R/W under pointer compression, 2024-2025 Maglev/TurboFan CVEs, V8 Sandbox escape via WASM jump table, generic UAF reclaim. Backed by v8_primitives.js.
  • references/kernel-exploitation.md — Linux UAF/cross-cache, Dirty Pagetable/Pagedirectory (CVE-2024-1086), msg_msg leak/spray, SLUBStick; Windows pool spray, PreviousMode + I/O Ring R/W, CLFS/AFD CVEs. Backed by kernel_lpe_skeleton.c.
  • references/exploit-feasibility.md — empirical mitigation matrix: rebuild the crash witness under permissive/distro/hardened/asan profiles, record which still fire, derive the blocked-technique map; /exploit is forbidden a technique the map marks blocked. Backed by feasibility_profile.py (build/replay, Linux/devcontainer) + exploit_context.py (cached checksec/libc + the assert_allowed gate). Pairs with reverse-engineering/references/rr-time-travel.md + coverage-reachability.md.

Keep looking

Skills are one crate of 328,083. Ordering is by how many stacks a row turns up in, so the top of any crate is what has actually been picked rather than what has the most stars.