Security

Skill haytamAroui/AZ-CLAUDE/.claude/skills/security

Security hardening for AZCLAUDE environments. Use when handling credentials, API keys, secrets, .env files, modifying hooks, reviewing untrusted code, importing shared skills, deploying, shipping, pushing to production, or when the user says "is this safe", "security check", "review for vulnerabilities", "check for secrets", "credential", "token", "password", or any work involving sensitive data. Also use before any /ship operation, when editing ~/.claude/settings.json, or when importing skills from external sources.From its SKILL.md

Install

npx -y skills add haytamAroui/AZ-CLAUDE --skill security

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

One thing to look at

1 stars1 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.

SKILL.md

4.2 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

Security Model

<instructions> AZCLAUDE runs code and modifies files. A 4-hook pipeline provides layered runtime protection.

4-Hook Runtime Pipeline

User prompt → [user-prompt.js]   — injection scan (every prompt)
                    ↓
Claude calls tools → [pre-tool-use.js] — Bash gate + Read gate + Write gate (14 rules)
                    ↓
Tool completes  → [post-tool-use.js] — behavioral sequence detection
                    ↓
Session ends    → [stop.js]          — security summary + cleanup

All hooks share /tmp/.azclaude-seclog-{PID} (JSONL). Session summary printed at stop.

Hook Integrity

SHA-256 hash in ~/.claude/.azclaude-integrity verifies hooks weren't tampered
_azclaude: true marker confirms hooks were installed by AZCLAUDE
If integrity check fails: show the diff, let user decide. Never silently overwrite.

Bash Gate (pre-tool-use.js)

Rule	Pattern	Action
`rce-curl-pipe`	`curl ... \| bash`	Block
`rce-wget-pipe`	`wget ... \| bash`	Block
`destructive-rm`	`rm -rf /` or `rm -rf ~`	Block
`shadow-npm-install`	`npm install` without `--ignore-scripts`	Warn
`env-var-echo`	`echo $SECRET` / `echo $TOKEN`	Warn

Read Gate (pre-tool-use.js)

Warns (once per session) when Claude reads credential files: .env, .env.*, secrets.json, secrets.yaml, credentials.json, id_rsa, id_ed25519, id_ecdsa, id_dsa, .pem, .p12, .pfx, .keystore

Write Gate — 19 Rules (pre-tool-use.js)

Scans all Edit/Write content before writing. Secrets → Block (exit 2). Others → Warn.

Key patterns: eval(, child_process.exec(, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, pickle.load(, os.system(, subprocess(..., shell=True), gets(, shell_exec(, Runtime.getRuntime().exec(, render_template_string(, MD5/SHA1/Math.random(), __proto__, yaml.load(, ../ traversal, ignore previous instructions, AWS/GH/GL/Slack/npm/GCP/Stripe/SendGrid/PEM tokens.

For fix guidance per pattern: references/security-details.md

Behavioral Sequence Detection (post-tool-use.js)

Tracks last 5 tool calls. Detects exfiltration patterns:

Read(.env) → Bash — credential read then shell execution → Warn
Read(.env) → WebFetch — credential read then external HTTP → Warn

Context Injection Protection (user-prompt.js)

Fires on every prompt (before session gate). Filters from goals.md + checkpoints:

ignore [all] previous instructions
disregard [all] previous instructions
override your [rules/instructions/safety]
you are now [a new/different/unrestricted]

Credential Handling

Credentials go in env vars — never in committed files
.env files: always in .gitignore, never staged by /ship
.mcp.json: use ${ENV_VAR} syntax, never plaintext
Before deploy/ship: scan for exposed secrets (AKIA, sk-, ghp_, glpat-, xoxb-)

Agent Permission Scoping

Agent type	Recommended permissions
Reviewer	Read, Glob, Grep, Bash — NO Write/Edit
Implementer	Read, Write, Edit, Bash, Glob, Grep
Orchestrator	Read, Agent — NO Write/Edit
Experiment	isolation: worktree (cannot touch main)

Supply Chain Awareness

Always check lockfile exists before npm install in new projects
npm audit CRITICAL findings → block; HIGH → warn
Loose pins (^, ~, *) in package.json → flag for review
Run /sentinel --supply-chain for full dependency scan

For full details: references/security-details.md </instructions>