Aws cli

AWS CLI

Safety-first wrapper for AWS CLI v2 (aws). Every command is classified by risk tier BEFORE execution — full AWS control, w/ anything irreversible, breaking, or cost-incurring gated behind explicit AskUserQuestion confirmation. Blast radius on AWS is an entire company's infra: wrong account/region/flag can destroy data, break prod, or spend real money.

When to Use

• Run/inspect any AWS service: EC2, S3, IAM, Lambda, RDS, DynamoDB, CloudFormation, Route 53, ECS/EKS, CloudFront, SQS/SNS, CloudWatch, KMS, Secrets Manager, …
• Audit resources, costs, security posture; tail logs; query w/ --query (JMESPath)
• Deploy/update infra, manage env config, rotate creds, debug failing calls
• Set up auth: profiles, IAM Identity Center (SSO), assume-role, MFA

Prerequisites (run once per session)

bash scripts/aws_preflight.sh [profile]

Reports version, profiles, region, and the active identity (sts get-caller-identity). NEVER run a write op w/o knowing which account+region you're pointed at. No profiles configured → guide setup via references/patterns.md (keys vs SSO).

Safety Model

Tier	Action Required	Examples
Safe	Execute immediately	describe-*, get-*, list-*, s3 ls, sts get-caller-identity, logs tail, any --dry-run
Write	Inform user, then execute	create-*, put-*, tag-*, lambda update-function-code, s3 cp/sync
Destructive	AskUserQuestion BEFORE executing	delete-*, terminate-instances, stop-*, run-instances (cost), modify-db-instance (downtime), change-resource-record-sets (live DNS), sg rules w/ 0.0.0.0/0
Forbidden	Triple typed confirmation, NEVER auto-confirm	close-account, IAM user/role deletion, kms schedule-key-deletion, delete-stack, s3 rb --force, delete-db-instance --skip-final-snapshot, snapshot/backup deletion, disabling CloudTrail/GuardDuty, purchases (RIs, Savings Plans, domains)

Full classification + per-service rules: references/safety-rules.md.

Decision Flow

Command received
  → bash scripts/aws_preflight.sh        (once per session — identity/region)
  → python3 scripts/aws_risk.py "<cmd>"  (deterministic tier + reason)
  → Safe?        Execute immediately
  → Write?       State target account/region + what changes → execute
  → Destructive? AskUserQuestion (incl. account, region, resource, blast radius) → execute or cancel
  → Forbidden?   Warn → typed confirmation → final confirm → execute or cancel
On failure → Self-Healing (aws <svc> <op> help → docs URI)

The classifier is advisory — apply judgment on top (a "write" against prod during business hours may still deserve a question). When the user's request implies a breaking change (engine upgrade, version bump, policy change, capacity change, anything w/ downtime or no rollback), ALWAYS AskUserQuestion first even if the verb looks mild.

Risk Classifier

python3 scripts/aws_risk.py "aws ec2 terminate-instances --instance-ids i-0abc"
# DESTRUCTIVE: Terminates instances — instance-store data is gone [ec2 terminate-instances]
# exit codes: 0=safe 10=write 20=destructive 30=forbidden

Verb-pattern based (describe/get/list→safe, create/put/update→write, delete/terminate/stop→destructive) + ~80 explicit overrides for cost, breaking, security & account-level ops. Escalation-only: overrides never lower a tier (sole exception: a 3-entry audited list of read-only ops w/ scary verbs, e.g. logs start-query).

Also catches:

• Compound commands: splits on &&, ;, |, $() — EVERY aws invocation classified, highest tier wins (quoted JMESPath pipes survive intact)
• Bulk loops: xargs/for/while + destructive op → forbidden; + write op → destructive
• Public exposure: 0.0.0.0/0, --acl public-read, "Principal": "*", weakening put-public-access-block
• Admin grants: AdministratorAccess/IAMFullAccess ARNs, inline "Action":"*" + "Resource":"*" policies
• Hidden cost/impact: restore-* into new billable stores, --desired-count 0 (scale-to-zero), s3 sync --delete
• Extracts --profile/--region into the output for the confirmation prompt

Forbidden Ops (never auto-confirm)

Command	Why
aws account close-account / organizations leave-organization	Account-level — catastrophic
iam delete-user/role/group, deactivate-mfa-device	Identity destruction, lockout risk
kms schedule-key-deletion / disable-key	All data encrypted under the key → unrecoverable
cloudformation delete-stack	Deletes EVERY resource the stack manages
s3 rb --force / s3api delete-bucket, dynamodb delete-table	Bulk permanent data loss
rds delete-db-instance --skip-final-snapshot	DB gone w/ NO backup
ec2 delete-snapshot, rds delete-db-snapshot, backup delete-*	Deletes the backups themselves
cloudtrail delete-trail/stop-logging, guardduty delete-detector	Removes audit/security monitoring
RI/Savings-Plan purchases, route53domains register-domain	Spends real money, multi-year commitments
Bulk destructive loops (xargs … delete)	Multiplies blast radius

AskUserQuestion Integration

For Destructive ops, always show account, region & resource; include a "Cancel" option:

Q: "Terminate i-0abc123 (prod-api, account 1234…, eu-west-1)?"
  - "Terminate it" — aws ec2 terminate-instances --instance-ids i-0abc123
  - "Stop instead (reversible)" — aws ec2 stop-instances --instance-ids i-0abc123
  - "Cancel"

Q: "Upgrade RDS prod-db to engine 16.4? Causes downtime; downgrade NOT possible."
  - "Upgrade now" / "Upgrade in maintenance window (--no-apply-immediately)" / "Cancel"

Also ask (not just for deletes) when: choosing between profiles/accounts, picking a region for new resources, anything creating ongoing cost, IAM policy changes, version upgrades, or ambiguous resource matches (multiple instances match a name). Forbidden ops → triple-confirmation protocol in references/safety-rules.md.

Wrong-Account/Region Guard

#1 real-world AWS accident. Before EVERY Write+ op:

1. aws sts get-caller-identity (or trust session preflight) — confirm account
2. Confirm region: explicit --region beats env beats profile default. New resources default to the profile region — state it
3. Multi-profile setups: prefer explicit --profile X --region Y on mutating commands over ambient env

Dry-Run & Preview

Prefer previews before mutating: EC2/VPC support --dry-run (returns DryRunOperation on success); CloudFormation → deploy --no-execute-changeset / create-change-set then review; IAM → simulate-principal-policy; S3 sync/rm → --dryrun; any command → --generate-cli-skeleton to inspect shape w/o executing.

Self-Healing

CLI surface is huge & evolves; on any error: read the message → aws <service> <op> help (offline, authoritative for the installed version) → if still unclear, WebFetch the v2 reference:

• Per-command: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/<service>/<operation>.html
• Index: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/index.html
• Userguide: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/userguide/
• Service errors (AccessDenied, throttling, etc.): see references/patterns.md

Service/command map + doc URIs: references/services.md.

Output & Querying

Need	Flag
Machine-readable	--output json (pipe to jq or use --query)
Human table	--output table
Filter server-side	--filters Name=…,Values=… (cheaper than client-side)
Filter client-side	--query '<JMESPath>' e.g. 'Reservations[].Instances[].InstanceId'
No pager	--no-cli-pager (ALWAYS append for non-interactive runs)
Big lists	auto-paginated; tune w/ --max-items, --page-size

JMESPath cookbook + pagination details: references/patterns.md.

Error Handling

Error	Cause	Fix
Unable to locate credentials	No profile/env creds	aws configure / aws configure sso, or export AWS_PROFILE=x
Token has expired / ExpiredToken	SSO/STS session ended	aws sso login --profile x
AccessDenied / UnauthorizedOperation	Missing IAM permission	Decode w/ sts decode-authorization-message if encoded; check policy
InvalidClientTokenId	Deactivated/wrong keys	Rotate keys in IAM
Could not connect to the endpoint URL	Wrong/missing region	Set --region; verify service exists in that region
ThrottlingException / Rate exceeded	API rate limits	Retry w/ backoff; CLI retries automatically (AWS_MAX_ATTEMPTS)
ValidationError/InvalidParameterValue	Bad arg shape	aws <svc> <op> help; --generate-cli-skeleton for the schema

Shell Safety

• ALWAYS --no-cli-pager (or pipe | cat) — aws v2 invokes a pager by default
• Quote JSON args in single quotes; for complex JSON prefer file://params.json
• NEVER echo secrets: secretsmanager get-secret-value, ssm get-parameter --with-decryption → redirect to file/var, never display unless asked
• NEVER put access keys on the command line; use profiles/env
• No --force-style skip flags on Destructive/Forbidden tiers w/o the confirmation flow
• Bulk ops: print the resource list FIRST, confirm once w/ exact count, only then loop

Integration

Pairs w/: terraform (IaC instead of imperative changes — prefer for repeatable infra), github-cli (CI/CD wiring), mongodb-atlas-cli / supabase-cli (other data planes), owasp-security / trailofbits-security (security audits of what the CLI finds), file-converter (transform exported JSON/CSV).