Generalupdate security audit
Skill GeneralLibrary/generalupdate-skill-codegen/.claude/skills/generalupdate-security-audit
Claude Code skill suite — auto-generate GeneralUpdate auto-update integration code for any .NET app in under 5 minutes. Covers scaffold, UI, strategy, advanced, and troubleshooting.
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Security audit guide for GeneralUpdate deployments. Covers IPC encryption, AppSecretKey strength, HTTPS enforcement, cross-tenant isolation, ZipSlip protection, and dependency vulnerability scanning. Generates audit report with severity ratings and remediation steps. Triggers on: "security", "audit", "安全审计", "安全审查", "漏洞", "vulnerability", "penetration", "渗透测试", "encryption", "IPC encryption", "AppSecretKey", "HTTPS", "cross-tenant", "ZipSlip", "路径穿越", "hardcoded key", "硬编码", "密钥泄露", "信息泄露", "privilege", "权限提升", "security review", "安全检查".
SKILL.md
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🔒 GeneralUpdate Security Audit Guide / GeneralUpdate 安全审计指南
<!-- generalupdate-runtime-contract:v10.5.0-rc.1 -->Mandatory Runtime Contract
Apply the repository RULES.md when available. Otherwise: respond in exactly
one language selected from the user's explicit choice, then dominant intent
(mixed-input tie: latest complete sentence); keep identifiers unchanged. User
format wins; otherwise use compact output for lightweight/unknown agents,
numbered evidence and fixes for debugging agents, and complete artifacts for
professional R&D agents. Apply platform safety → user constraints → v10.5
contract → this workflow → presentation defaults; security, compilability, and
scope win conflicts. Generate only v10.5.0-rc.1 desktop APIs
(UpdateRequest/SetConfig or SetSource, then LaunchAsync; enum AppType);
never generate Configinfo or IsComplated. Use Core alone for Core scenarios,
Bowl alone for Bowl scenarios, no separate Differential package, and the
matching mobile package. Use native tool schemas, one operation per call, no
secrets, at most 20 paths/results, and queries of at most 500 characters.
Deliver only relevant runnable artifacts, exact steps, warnings, and checks;
never claim unexecuted verification or present pseudo-code as production-ready.
Comprehensive coverage of security risk surfaces for GeneralUpdate deployments. Based on code audit findings (17 CRITICAL/HIGH items) and best practices.
全面覆盖 GeneralUpdate 部署的安全风险面。基于代码审计发现（17 CRITICAL/HIGH 项）和最佳实践。
📋 Pre-Audit Information Collection / 审计前信息收集
Collect the following information before beginning the audit. Ask the user when anything is unclear:
在开始审计之前收集以下信息。如有不明确之处，请向用户确认：
### Deployment Environment / 部署环境
- Deployment mode / 部署模式: ______ (Intranet 内网 / Public 公网 / Hybrid 混合)
- Tenant mode / 租户模式: ______ (Single-tenant 单租户 / Multi-tenant 多租户)
- Number of clients / 客户端数量: ______
- Client OS / 客户端操作系统: ______ (Windows / Linux / macOS / Mixed 混合)
### Server / 服务端
- Backend type / 后端类型: ______ (GeneralSpacestation / Custom 自定义 / OSS)
- Transport protocol / 传输协议: ______ (HTTP / HTTPS)
- Auth method / 认证方式: ______ (Bearer / Basic / HMAC / None 无)
- Is API publicly accessible / API 是否公开访问: ______ (Yes 是 / No 否, with network isolation 有网络隔离)
### Client / 客户端
- GeneralUpdate version / GeneralUpdate 版本: ______
- Using IPC / 是否使用 IPC: ______ (Yes 是 / No 否)
- Using Bowl / 是否使用 Bowl: ______ (Yes 是 / No 否)
- Using Differential / 是否使用 Differential: ______ (Yes 是 / No 否)
Security Audit Matrix / 安全审计矩阵
| # | Check Item / 检查项 | Severity / 严重度 | Description / 描述 | Remediation / 修复措施 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S01 | AppSecretKey Strength / AppSecretKey 强度 | 🔴 CRITICAL | Key too short, alphabetic only, identical to sample code / 密钥长度不足、纯字母、与示例代码相同 | Use ≥ 32 chars random key with upper+lower+digits+symbols / 使用 ≥ 32 字符，大小写+数字+符号的随机密钥 |
| S02 | IPC Encryption / IPC 加密 | 🔴 CRITICAL | Default IPC encryption key hardcoded in binary / 默认 IPC 加密密钥硬编码在二进制中 | Ensure AppSecretKey is unique and consistent across server and client / 确保 AppSecretKey 唯一且服务端/客户端一致 |
| S03 | HTTPS Transport / HTTPS 传输 | 🟠 HIGH | UpdateUrl uses HTTP instead of HTTPS / UpdateUrl 使用 HTTP 而非 HTTPS | Enforce HTTPS in production; configure HSTS / 生产环境强制 HTTPS；配置 HSTS |
| S04 | ZipSlip Path Traversal / ZipSlip 路径穿越 | 🔴 CRITICAL | ZIP extraction does not validate ../ paths / 解压 ZIP 时未验证 ../ 路径 | Validate that archive entry paths stay within the target directory / 验证压缩包条目路径是否在目标目录内 |
| S05 | Multi-tenant Isolation / 多租户隔离 | 🔴 CRITICAL | Server does not isolate tenants by ProductId / 服务端未按 ProductId 隔离租户 | Add tenant identity verification middleware on server / 服务端添加租户身份验证中间件 |
| S06 | Event Log Leakage / 事件日志泄露 | 🟡 MEDIUM | ExceptionEventArgs logs may contain sensitive paths / ExceptionEventArgs 日志可能包含敏感路径 | Sanitize before logging; filter paths and keys / 脱敏后记录，过滤路径和密钥 |
| S07 | Differential Package Signing / 差分包签名 | 🟠 HIGH | Differential patches have no digital signature verification / 差分补丁无数字签名验证 | Apply Authenticode signing to update packages / 对更新包进行 Authenticode 签名 |
| S08 | Temp Directory Permissions / 临时目录权限 | 🟡 MEDIUM | Temporary extraction directory permissions may be overly broad / 临时解压目录权限可能过大 | Set to current-user read/write only / 设置为仅为当前用户可读写 |
| S09 | OSS Bucket Permissions / OSS Bucket 权限 | 🟠 HIGH | Update package storage bucket set to public-read / 更新包存储 Bucket 设为公共读 | Set to private; use pre-signed URLs / 设置为私有，使用预签名 URL |
| S10 | Dependency Vulnerabilities / 依赖版本漏洞 | 🟡 MEDIUM | GeneralUpdate and its dependencies may have known CVEs / GeneralUpdate 及其依赖可能存在已知 CVE | Regularly check NuGet dependency security advisories / 定期检查 NuGet 依赖安全公告 |
| S11 | Rollback Attack / 回滚攻击 | 🟠 HIGH | Attacker can submit a downgraded version to force old install / 攻击者可提交降级版本号强制安装旧版本 | Server validates version is monotonically increasing / 服务端校验版本号单调递增 |
| S12 | Download Integrity / 下载完整性 | 🟠 HIGH | Downloaded update package has no integrity verification / 下载的更新包无完整性校验 | Ensure Pipeline includes HashMiddleware / 确保 Pipeline 包含 HashMiddleware |
| S13 | Bowl Privilege Escalation / Bowl 提权 | 🟡 MEDIUM | Bowl crash daemon running with high privileges may be abused / Bowl 崩溃守护以高权限运行可能被滥用 | Run Bowl with least necessary privileges / 以最小必要权限运行 Bowl |
| S14 | Information Leakage via Manifest / 信息泄露通过 manifest | 🔵 LOW | ProductId and version numbers in manifest.json can be enumerated / manifest.json 中的 ProductId、版本号可被枚举 | Do not expose manifest files in non-public environments / 非公开环境下不暴露 manifest 文件 |
Audit Report Output Format / 审计报告输出格式
After completing the audit, output in the following format:
完成审计后按以下格式输出：
## 🔒 GeneralUpdate Security Audit Report / GeneralUpdate 安全审计报告
### Summary / 概要
- Project / 项目: ______
- Audit date / 审计日期: ______
- Overall rating / 总体评分: A/B/C/D/F
- Critical issues / 严重问题: ______
- High risk / 高风险: ______
- Medium risk / 中风险: ______
- Low risk / 低风险: ______
### Critical Issues (Must fix immediately) / 严重问题（必须立即修复）
- S01 AppSecretKey Strength / AppSecretKey 强度: ⚠️ Current key length is X, needs ≥ 32 / 当前密钥长度为 X，需要 ≥ 32
Fix / 修复: ______
### High Risk (Fix as soon as possible) / 高风险（建议尽快修复）
...
### Medium Risk (Assess then fix) / 中风险（评估后修复）
...
### Low Risk (Documented) / 低风险（记录在案）
...
### Remediation Priority / 修复建议优先级
1. Immediate / 立即：S01, S03, S04
2. This week / 本周：S05, S07, S09
3. This month / 本月：S08, S10, S11
Security Configuration Checklist / 安全配置检查清单
- AppSecretKey length ≥ 32 chars, mixed upper+lower+digits+symbols / AppSecretKey 长度 ≥ 32 字符，混合大小写+数字+符号
- HTTPS in production / 生产环境使用 HTTPS
- IPC file encoding set to Encoding.UTF8 / IPC 文件编码设为 Encoding.UTF8
- Pipeline includes HashMiddleware for integrity verification / Pipeline 包含 HashMiddleware 做完整性校验
- OSS Bucket permissions set to private / OSS Bucket 权限设为私有
- Server isolates tenants by ProductId / 服务端按 ProductId 隔离租户
- Version numbers strictly monotonically increasing / 版本号严格单调递增
- Update packages signed with Authenticode / 更新包进行 Authenticode 签名
- Zip extraction has path traversal protection / Zip 解压有路径穿越防护
- No sensitive information recorded in logs / 日志中不记录敏感信息
Related Skills / 相关技能
/generalupdate-init— Fix issues found in audit / 修复审计发现的问题/generalupdate-advanced— IPC replacement, custom authentication / IPC 替换、自定义认证/generalupdate-troubleshoot— Reference for known security issues / 已知安全问题参考