Analyze apple silicon arm64e
Skill gaelic-ghost/socket/plugins/reverse-engineering-skills/skills/analyze-apple-silicon-arm64e
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Analyze AArch64 and Apple arm64e instruction, calling-convention, pointer-authentication, tagged-pointer, Rosetta, and hardware-mitigation evidence. Use when Codex must interpret Apple Silicon disassembly, registers, stack frames, SIMD, compiler idioms, PAC instructions or authenticated pointers, CPU subtypes, top-byte handling, SPTM or PPL context, memory tagging, or Memory Integrity Enforcement without generalizing behavior across unsupported hardware or OS builds.
SKILL.md
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Analyze Apple Silicon arm64e
Overview
Interpret low-level evidence using the selected slice, exact hardware, OS build, and tool behavior. Separate the AArch64 ABI from Apple-specific arm64e and hardware-security claims.
Read references/apple-silicon-arm64e.md when decoding calling conventions, pointer authentication, tagged addresses, Rosetta boundaries, or hardware-scoped mitigations.
Workflow
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Establish execution identity.
- Record artifact hash, CPU type and subtype, selected slice, UUID, minimum OS and SDK clues, tool and version, loader, and base address.
- Record hardware model and SoC, OS build, and native, translated, Simulator, VM, or physical-device context for runtime evidence.
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Apply the AArch64 ABI baseline.
- Track argument and result registers, stack pointer alignment, frame and link registers, callee-saved state, SIMD or floating-point registers, and aggregate-return conventions.
- Confirm the actual prologue, epilogue, and call sites before accepting a decompiler signature.
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Identify compiler-generated patterns.
- Separate ordinary branches, tail calls, thunks, stubs, outlined helpers, stack probes, reference-counting calls, async lowering, and switch or jump-table patterns.
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Interpret pointer authentication.
- Record PAC-related instructions, key and modifier clues available from the instruction, authenticated branch or return behavior, and whether a displayed pointer retains, strips, or misrepresents PAC or tag bits.
- Do not treat authenticated control flow as proof that every pointer or data path is protected.
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Normalize addresses deliberately.
- Preserve the original displayed value.
- Record any top-byte, tag-bit, PAC, sign-extension, or slide normalization used for a tool lookup.
- Confirm that normalization matches the artifact and environment rather than applying a universal mask.
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Bound hardware-security claims.
- Tie PPL, SPTM, memory tagging, Memory Integrity Enforcement, and other mitigations to current Apple documentation, exact SoC family, and OS build.
- Distinguish a compiler capability, hardware feature, OS policy, and observed enforcement.
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Preserve Rosetta boundaries.
- Record whether the artifact and process are Intel or Arm, where translation occurs, and which address space or generated code the observation represents.
- Keep Intel-era preservation findings separate from native Apple Silicon behavior.
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Cross-check important conclusions with disassembly, references, runtime registers, and a second tool when the first tool has incomplete
arm64esupport.
Guardrails
- Do not silently analyze the wrong universal slice.
- Do not present
arm64andarm64eas interchangeable. - Do not erase PAC or tag information without preserving the original value and transformation.
- Do not generalize a mitigation from one SoC generation or product family to all Apple Silicon.
- Do not use Simulator or VM behavior as proof of physical-device secure boot, PAC, Secure Enclave, or memory-integrity enforcement.
Output
Return execution identity, ABI interpretation, PAC and address-normalization observations, hardware-scoped mitigation context, tool limitations, and the next instruction or runtime check.