Audit

Auditing a Forseti deployment

Produce a ranked findings list, not a lecture. Check the live config against the deployment's own tooling and the operator guide, rank by severity, and let the user choose what to fix. Read the config that is actually deployed; do not assume the example files.

1. Locate the config and the deployment shape

Find the active config.toml ($FORSETI_CONFIG_PATH), infra/kratos/kratos.yml, infra/hydra/hydra.yml, and how it is run (single binary vs multi-instance, SQLite vs Postgres, behind a proxy or not). Rationale for each item below is in docs/operator-guide.md.

2. Run the built-in linter

forseti config-check --strict lints the Ory config and is the fastest source of real findings. Fold its output into the punch-list.

3. Walk the checklist

For each item, record pass/fail and severity. Highest-severity items first:

• 2FA enforcement (critical). In kratos.yml, both session.whoami.required_aal and selfservice.flows.settings.required_aal must be highest_available. settings.required_aal: aal1 opens the factor-removal bypass (an attacker with the password or recovery email strips the second factor). Forseti cannot enforce this from its side.
• Secrets rotated and unique. Hydra secrets.system and pairwise salt; Kratos secrets.cookie and secrets.cipher (exactly 32 chars); Forseti [security].cookie_secret set to a stable ≥32-byte value (not the ephemeral per-boot key). None committed to the repo.
• No placeholder secrets in the live config. Confirm no OAuth client_secret, audit token, or SSH/SAML key was carried over from an example or playground config; rotate anything that was.
• Audit webhook token. [audit].webhook_token set and matching the bearer in every web_hook in kratos.yml (Forseti refuses to boot if empty, but confirm it is not the dev placeholder).
• Internal listener not public. [internal].bind on loopback only. It carries the audit receiver and the POSIX resolver (your directory); the network ACL is load-bearing once it leaves loopback.
• Forwarded-for trust. [proxy].trust_forwarded_for = true only behind a proxy that strips inbound forwarded-for headers, else IP spoofing bypasses rate limits.
• TLS and headers. Reverse proxy terminates TLS and passes X-Forwarded-Proto: https + X-Forwarded-Host; CSP frame_ancestors / X-Frame-Options set for clickjacking defense.
• Webhook signing key. data/webhook-signing-key.pem present, 0600, valid Ed25519 PKCS#8, and backed up (rotation is stop-replace-restart).
• Admin surface. [admin].allowed_emails is the intended operator set and non-empty; confirm the two-tier operator/org-owner model is understood. Admin requires AAL2 in code.
• Database and backups. Postgres (not SQLite) for multi-instance, or corruption results. Kratos and Hydra Postgres backed up (losing Hydra's JWKS invalidates every issued id_token).
• DCR hardening. [oauth].dcr_reserved_names denylist populated and DCR rate limits set.
• Metrics. /metrics gated by license and [metrics].scrape_token, and served only on the internal listener.
• Retention scheduled. forseti audit-prune and forseti unverified-prune run on a timer/cron; they do not run automatically.
• Log hygiene. Kratos log.leak_sensitive_values: false outside dev; secrets supplied via env, not TOML; email creds never over tls = "none".

4. Report

Present a numbered, severity-ranked punch-list (critical first), one line per finding with the offending file/key and the fix, in the style of the rust:review / security:review skills. Then offer to apply the fixes the user selects. Do not change config as part of the audit itself unless asked.