Supply chain scan

Skill Flo5k5/supply-chain-scan/skills/supply-chain-scan

Run a morning supply-chain safety scan on the JS/TS, Python, Docker, Go, Rust or NuGet project the user is about to work on. Monorepo-aware (recursively finds lockfiles and Dockerfiles in nested packages). Checks the lockfiles for known-malicious packages (OSV MAL- feed) and CVEs, flags freshly-published dependencies (zero-hour heuristic), runs the package manager's CVE audit, checks the per-project release-cooldown / Docker base-image digest pinning, flags whether real-time install-time protection (Aikido Safe Chain) is active, scans build manifests for install-time code execution (the phantom-gyp trick), flags oversized undeclared root JS payloads, and flags repo/agent configs that auto-execute when the folder is opened in an AI coding agent (the Miasma vector). Account-free, no per-project CI. Use at the start of a dev day, when opening or cloning a repo, or right after pulling/updating dependencies or a Dockerfile base image.From its SKILL.md

Install

npx -y skills add Flo5k5/supply-chain-scan --skill supply-chain-scan

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

One thing to look at

3 stars3 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.

SKILL.md

4.8 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it

Supply-chain morning scan

A local, account-free gate for the project the user is about to work on. It runs the bundled supply-chain-scan CLI (zero-dependency Node), which covers the free layered defense: osv-scanner (known-malicious + CVE for npm, PyPI, Go & Rust), the package manager's CVE audit, a freshly-published-dependency heuristic, the per-project release-cooldown / Docker base-image digest-pinning checks, plus three checks aimed at the 2026 Shai-Hulud/Miasma vectors: build-manifest scan (install-time code execution such as the binding.gyp phantom gyp trick), undeclared-large-root-JS detection (obfuscated worm payloads like bun_environment.js), and an agent/IDE-config scan that flags repo configs which auto-execute when the folder is opened in Claude Code / Cursor / Gemini CLI / VS Code.

How to run

Target project: if the user names a project/path, use it; otherwise use the current working directory.
Run the CLI (prefer the bundled copy; fall back to npx if not run as a plugin):
```
node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/cli.js" <project-dir>     # when installed as a Claude Code plugin
# or, if installed from npm:
npx supply-chain-scan <project-dir>
```
The scan is recursive by default: it finds lockfiles and Dockerfiles in nested packages (monorepos), skipping node_modules/build/vendored dirs. Useful flags: --no-recursive / --depth N (bound the walk — handy on huge workspaces where osv-scanner gets slow), --fresh-days N (default 3), --max-js-mb N (root-JS size threshold, default 0.5), --no-agent-configs (skip the auto-exec-on-open check), --images (also pull+scan Docker base images — slow, opt-in), --json (machine-readable).
If the output says osv-scanner not installed, it's a one-time global install (the line shows the exact command for the user's OS: brew install osv-scanner / winget install Google.OSVScanner). Offer to run it, then re-run the scan.

How to report back

Read the exit code and the ▶ sections, then give a crisp verdict:

exit 0 (CLEAN) → one green line: safe to start.
exit 1 (REVIEW) → summarize each ⚠/✗: name the known-malicious or vulnerable package(s), any freshly-published dependency, a missing release cooldown, an unpinned Docker base image, a build manifest that runs code at install time, an oversized undeclared root JS file, or an agent/IDE config that auto-executes on folder open — with the concrete next step for each. Don't bury the lede. The build-manifest, large-JS and agent-config findings are the 2026 Shai-Hulud/Miasma vectors: treat an unexpected one as high priority. The install-time protection line (Safe Chain) is ℹ, not ⚠ — it never blocks the verdict, but mention it: it's the one layer that acts before an install finishes, which none of the other checks can do.
exit 2 (SETUP) → tell the user exactly what to install.

The per-project config (offer to add it)

The only thing a project should configure is the release cooldown (refuse versions published < N days ago):

pnpm → minimumReleaseAge: 4320 (3 days) in pnpm-workspace.yaml
uv (Python) → exclude-newer = "<ISO date>" under [tool.uv]
Docker → pin every FROM base image to an @sha256:<digest>

If the scan flags one as missing, offer to add it.

Scope

Local, no account, no CI. Catches known-malicious + CVE + zero-hour-fresh + pinning gaps across npm, PyPI, Docker, Go and Rust, plus install-time / on-open code-execution vectors (build manifests, root JS payloads, agent/IDE configs). It does NOT do behavioral analysis of novel malware, nor does it scan your home directory for harvested credentials — for behavioral detection, recommend the free Socket.dev GitHub App as a complementary layer (not required for this check).