Firewall best practices audit

Firewall Best-Practices Audit

Overview

Use this skill to audit a firewall or NGFW rulebase for security and operational hygiene, vendor-neutrally, over the parsing-* intermediate JSON schema. The audit reads normalized security_policies, nat_rules, address/service objects and groups, zones, vpn_tunnels, system, and admin_users, then emits prioritized findings across the security and operational check families (full catalog: references/check-catalog.md). Each finding carries a severity, a confidence, the affected references, why it matters, and remediation.

This skill is deliberately framework-agnostic. It answers "is this rulebase hardened by general best practice" rather than mapping findings to a compliance framework. It never cites control IDs and never claims an environment is compliant.

The audit reports findings, not verdicts. It never claims a config is "secure" — at best it reports "no in-scope findings" with caveats about what could not be checked (for example, hit-count or last-used data that the static schema does not carry). The output is decision-grade: a short posture line, a severity tally, the list of checks that were skipped for missing data, and a prioritized list of top fixes.

Scope and routing

Operate on the normalized parsing-* schema; do not hand-audit raw vendor text when a parser exists. Treat framework-control mapping as out of scope, route migrations to firewall-config-conversion, and route parity or drift comparisons to firewall-config-diff.

Runtime intake

Before starting the workflow, inspect the request, supplied artifacts, and available approved read-only evidence. If unresolved facts could materially change safety, scope, correctness, confidence, or the requested output, read references/runtime-intake.md.

For each unresolved material fact whose catalog condition is true, invoke Claude AskUserQuestion or Codex request_user_input before continuing or issuing an open-ended request. Ask at most three single-select catalog questions per round. After each response, ask another round whenever any unresolved material catalog condition remains true; continue only when none remain. Do not repeat answered questions or show the full catalog. Without a native tool, present each selected catalog question with its 2-3 labeled choices and a free-text Other path in concise plain text; do not substitute a generic checklist.

Never request secrets or unredacted customer data. Treat intake answers as task context, not approval for a live change; obtain separate explicit approval before configuration, commit, upgrade, reboot, delete, or failover actions.

Policy population contract

Parser output can include a vendor-default policy marked _implicit: true. Partition security_policies once before running any rule-scoped check:

• explicit_rules — every rule whose _implicit value is not true;
• enabled_explicit_rules — explicit_rules whose disabled value is not true;
• disabled_explicit_rules — explicit_rules whose disabled value is true; and
• implicit_rules — rules marked _implicit: true.

All active-risk, order, logging, exposure, shadow, redundancy, and overlap checks operate on enabled_explicit_rules. Cleanup/state checks may inspect explicit_rules or disabled_explicit_rules, but never implicit_rules. Reference and object-usage checks must likewise exclude implicit_rules and state whether disabled explicit rules count as references. Never emit a finding against an implicit rule or compare one with an explicit rule.

SEC-EMPTY-POLICYSET fires when explicit_rules is empty, even if a parser appended an implicit default.

Evaluation context and phase

Before SEC-SHADOW, SEC-REDUNDANT, SEC-OVERLAP, or OPS-CONSOLIDATE, partition enabled_explicit_rules into a vendor evaluation population and sort each population by numeric _rule_index. Never compare rules across these populations:

• SRX: partition first by root, _logical_system, or _tenant; within that container, keep each concrete source-zone/destination-zone pair separate and keep from-zone any to-zone any global policy in a later, separate phase.
• PAN-OS: partition by _vsys and use the parser's fully merged Panorama/ local order. Zones are match fields inside that population, not rulebase containers.
• FortiGate: partition by _vdom; zones remain match fields within the ordered VDOM rulebase.
• Cisco ASA: only use a concrete parser-derived inbound binding/source zone as the available rulebase boundary. The shared schema has no ACL name or direction field, so an absent or ambiguous binding is not safe to flatten.

The shared schema has no general policy-phase or origin field. If the applicable container, binding, merged-order provenance, _rule_index, or object resolution is absent, duplicated, or ambiguous, skip/downgrade the dependent comparison instead of inventing an order, and put an evidence-gap warning in the skipped-check summary.

SEC-NO-DENY-ALL evaluates each applicable context using _rule_index, not array order. A qualifying explicit terminal rule uses one of deny or drop (the normalized silent-drop values), match-all source, destination, and application/service criteria, no restricting schedule/user/negation, and start or end logging. reset-both is a reject action, not a deny alias. On SRX, a global logged deny can be a fallback only when the relevant zone-pair phase has no earlier catch-all rule that makes global policy unreachable. An implicit default can explain effective enforcement, but never supplies explicit log visibility.

SEC-ZONES-NAT-NO-POLICY requires evidence that an enabled allow rule can carry at least part of the intended NAT flow in the same vendor container: its source/destination zones and resolved source/destination addresses must overlap the NAT rule. A deny-only rule, disabled permit, unrelated zone, or mere textual reference does not supply coverage. If address objects cannot be resolved, skip/downgrade the conclusion and record the evidence gap.

Input Handling

Route on what you were given:

• Parsed intermediate schema (the vendor-neutral JSON produced by any parsing-* skill; the schema definition lives in the parsing-srx-configs skill) — audit directly. Read metadata.source_vendor to drive vendor-specific remediation snippets. metadata.source_vendor is the canonical schema field; for robustness also accept a legacy metadata.vendor key if a non-conformant parse provides one — read whichever is present.
• Raw config — identify the vendor from the syntax, run the matching parsing-* skill (parsing-cisco-configs, parsing-fortinet-configs, parsing-palo-configs, parsing-srx-configs) to produce the intermediate schema, then audit the result. Never re-implement parsing in this skill. For a single live device pulled via NETCONF/MCP, parsing-srx-configs permits auditing from the extracted hierarchical sections without full schema emission — still route the extraction through that skill; never hand-parse raw text ad hoc.
• Unsupported vendor with no parser — say so plainly: there is no parser for this vendor, so a structured audit cannot be produced; offer to audit a manually-normalized schema or to reason about pasted excerpts without finding IDs.

As of v1.1 the audit also reads system.ssh, system.auth, system.control_plane_protection, zones[].screen, and security_services to cover device-plane hardening (SSH/management hardening, password/lockout policy, screen presence, and unreferenced security services); any of these fields that is absent simply skips its dependent check.

Graceful degradation: the schema is static, so some checks have no input (for example, anything depending on hit counts or last-used timestamps, and any check needing a field the source parser did not populate). When a field is missing, skip the dependent check rather than guessing, and record every skipped check in the audit summary so the gap is visible.

Severity & Confidence

Severity	One-line criterion
Critical	Direct, exploitable exposure — any-any-allow across a trust boundary, dangerous service open to untrust, plaintext admin reachable externally, broken/keyless VPN.
High	Strong weakness — overly permissive allow, shadowed rules hiding later policy, weak VPN/IKE crypto (DES/3DES/MD5/SHA1/DH<14), no logging on permit-to-untrust.
Medium	Material hygiene gap — missing explicit deny-all, redundant/overlapping rules, oversized any in one field, missing logging on internal allows.
Low	Minor hardening or correctness nit — overlapping objects, weak naming, narrow over-broad object.
Info	Operational cleanup with no direct risk — unused/duplicate objects, oversized groups, missing descriptions, consolidation opportunities, disabled rules.

This table is the general scale with context-adjusted examples; the per-check default severities in references/check-catalog.md are the authoritative defaults (a check's catalog severity wins over any example here, since real severity is adjusted by logging, scope, and trust-boundary context).

Confidence is one of two values:

• definitive — the schema fully supports the conclusion (e.g. src_addresses and dst_addresses both contain any with action: allow).
• heuristic — the conclusion depends on something the schema does not fully guarantee. Downgrade to heuristic when rule order is incomplete or ambiguous (shadow/redundancy claims), when object references are unresolved (orphan/unused claims), or when NAT could change real exposure. Label these as heuristic so reviewers verify before acting.

Audit Workflow

1. Establish input + vendor. Confirm you have the intermediate schema (parse first if raw). Read metadata.source_vendor and metadata counts to size the audit.
2. Resolve objects and zones. Expand address_groups, service_groups, and application_groups to members; map security_policies src_zones/dst_zones to zones and their interfaces; note nat_rules that change effective exposure. Flag references that do not resolve (drives heuristic confidence later).
3. Run the security checks. Permissiveness/any-any, shadow/redundancy/overlap, missing deny-all and logging, dangerous exposed services, plaintext management, weak VPN/IKE/IPsec crypto. Also run the v1.1 device-plane families: SSH/management hardening (SEC-SSH-ROOT-LOGIN), security-services-unreferenced (SEC-SERVICES-UNREFERENCED), zone/NAT-without-policy (SEC-ZONES-NAT-NO-POLICY) plus the empty-policyset coverage warning (SEC-EMPTY-POLICYSET), host-inbound exposure (SEC-HOST-INBOUND-EXPOSURE), screen presence (SEC-NO-SCREEN), auth hardening (SEC-AUTH-HARDENING), control-plane/RE-filter protection (SEC-NO-CONTROL-PLANE-PROTECTION), IPv6 posture (SEC-IPV6-POSTURE), and remote-log completeness (OPS-LOG-COMPLETENESS). See references/check-catalog.md for the full check definitions, schema fields, and severity rationale.
4. Run the operational checks. Unused/duplicate objects, oversized groups, naming/description gaps, rule consolidation, disabled-rule cleanup. Also from references/check-catalog.md.
5. Assign severity + confidence. Apply the rubric above; downgrade to heuristic where rule order or object resolution is incomplete or NAT may alter exposure.
6. Attach remediation. Give vendor-neutral guidance plus a concrete snippet in the source vendor's syntax. See references/remediation-patterns.md for per-vendor fix patterns keyed by finding category.
7. Produce the output. Emit each finding with the Finding template, then the Audit Summary with the posture line, severity tally, skipped checks, and prioritized top fixes.

Reference Material (load on demand)

• references/check-catalog.md — full catalog of security + operational checks (id, what it detects, schema fields, severity rationale).
• references/remediation-patterns.md — per-vendor (Cisco/Palo/FortiGate/SRX) fix snippets keyed by finding category.
• references/example-audit.md — a worked audit against a parsing-* fixture.

Output Templates

Finding

[<id>] <CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW|INFO> (<definitive|heuristic>) — <title>
Category: <security|operational> / <subcategory>
Affected: <rule names/IDs, object names, zones>
Why it matters: <1–3 lines>
Remediation: <vendor-neutral guidance>
Fix (<source-vendor>):
  <concrete snippet in the source vendor's syntax>

Audit Summary

Posture: <one line; never "secure" — say "no in-scope findings" with caveats>
Findings: Critical <n>  High <n>  Medium <n>  Low <n>  Info <n>
Checks skipped (no data): <e.g. hit-count-dependent checks>
Top fixes (prioritized):
  1. <id> — <one line>
  2. <id> — <one line>

Common Pitfalls

• Claiming a config is "secure" or "compliant" — only report "no in-scope findings" with caveats about what could not be checked.
• Mapping findings to compliance frameworks — stay framework-agnostic and cite no control IDs.
• Re-implementing parsing instead of delegating to the matching parsing-* skill.
• Reporting heuristic findings (possible shadow) as definitive when rule order or object references are incomplete.
• Auditing only the internet edge — include internal, management, VPN, and inter-zone rules.
• Ignoring NAT when reasoning about real exposure — a translated address can change what a rule actually permits.
• Flagging disabled rules as active risk — note them as cleanup, not exposure.
• Treating an unreferenced object as a finding without confirming the schema captured all references.
• Putting real secrets or PSKs in example output — always redact.
• Silently dropping checks when a schema field is missing — list them as skipped in the summary.

Verification Checklist

• Confirm input type (parsed schema vs raw config) and source vendor.
• For raw config, the matching parsing-* skill was run first.
• Every finding has id, severity, confidence, affected refs, rationale, remediation.
• Remediation includes vendor-neutral guidance + a source-vendor snippet.
• Heuristic findings are labeled; definitive vs heuristic is correct.
• Skipped checks (missing schema fields) are listed in the summary.
• Output makes no "secure"/"compliant" claim and no compliance-framework mapping.
• No real secrets in any snippet.