Scan

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Input normalization

Raw input: "$ARGUMENTS"

Before doing anything else, derive these variables and use them throughout:

• Strip leading/trailing whitespace from the input
• If input starts with http:// or https:// → TARGET_URL = input as-is
• If input starts with // → TARGET_URL = https: + input
• Otherwise → TARGET_URL = https:// + input
• TARGET_URL_HTTP = TARGET_URL with scheme replaced by http://
• TARGET_HOST = hostname only (no scheme, no path, no port)
• TARGET_ORIGIN = scheme + :// + hostname (e.g. https://www.acb.com)

Example: www.acb.com → TARGET_URL=https://www.acb.com, TARGET_HOST=www.acb.com

Authorization and safety

• This assessment is authorized by the asset owner
• Non-destructive testing only — no DoS, brute force, credential attacks, or mass requests
• Passive first, targeted low-risk validation only when needed to confirm a finding

Step 0 — Auto-setup (always run first)

Call the setup tool before anything else. It will:

• Detect the OS (macOS, Ubuntu/Debian, RHEL, Arch, or other)
• Install required Python packages (requests, beautifulsoup4, dnspython) via pip
• Check availability of curl, python3, and npx
• Print install instructions for any missing tool, specific to the detected OS

Read the setup output carefully:

• Note the detected OS — include it in the report's Methodology section
• If [warn] curl not found → stop and show the user the fix command; curl is required
• If [skip] npx not found → Step 4b will be skipped; note this in the report
• If [error] python3 not found → stop and show the user the fix command; python3 is required

Fixed execution plan

Run every step below in order. Do not skip steps. Do not add steps not listed here.

Step 1 — Security headers and cookies

Call fetch_headers with TARGET_URL.

Analyze the response for:

• Missing: Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy, Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy
• Insecure values: ACAO: *, ACAO with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
• Technology disclosure: X-Powered-By, Server header
• Cookie flags on Set-Cookie: missing Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite

Also call fetch_headers with TARGET_URL_HTTP to check for HTTPS redirect.

Step 2 — Sensitive path exposure

Call probe_paths with TARGET_URL as base_url.

Flag any path returning 200 as a potential finding. Assign severity:

• CRITICAL: /.env*, /.git/config, /actuator/env (credential exposure)
• HIGH: /.git/HEAD, /phpinfo.php, /swagger.json, /openapi.json, /graphql, /graphiql
• MEDIUM: /admin, /admin/login, /wp-admin, /actuator, /actuator/health, /server-status
• LOW: /robots.txt, /sitemap.xml, /.well-known/security.txt, /health, /metrics, /version

Step 3 — Page and HTML analysis

Call fetch_page with TARGET_URL.

From the HTML, extract: a) All <script src="..."> URLs — collect for Step 4 b) All <link rel="stylesheet" href="..."> external URLs c) Check for missing integrity= attribute on external scripts/styles (SRI) d) Check all <a target="_blank"> links for missing rel="noopener noreferrer" (tabnapping) e) Check all <form> elements: action over HTTP on HTTPS page, missing CSRF token patterns, autocomplete on password fields f) Check for <base> tag (base tag injection risk) g) Check for <meta http-equiv="refresh"> (open redirect risk) h) Check <iframe> tags for missing sandbox attribute i) Scan inline event handlers (onclick, onerror, onload) for dangerous patterns: document., window., eval, fetch, cookie, localStorage j) Scan HTML comments for: password, api_key, secret, token, todo, staging, localhost, IP addresses

Step 4 — JavaScript analysis

For each script URL collected in Step 3 (limit to first 10, prioritize same-origin):

• Resolve relative URLs against TARGET_ORIGIN
• Call fetch_js with the resolved URL

In each JS file, scan for:

Secrets (CRITICAL/HIGH):

• AWS: AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}, aws_secret_access_key
• GCP: service account JSON, AIza[0-9A-Za-z\-_]{35}
• GitHub tokens: ghp_, github_pat_
• Stripe: sk_live_, pk_live_, rk_live_
• Twilio, SendGrid, Slack, Firebase, Sentry API keys
• Generic: password\s*=\s*["'][^"']{6,}, secret\s*=\s*["'][^"']+
• JWT tokens: eyJ[A-Za-z0-9\-_]+\.[A-Za-z0-9\-_]+\.[A-Za-z0-9\-_]+
• MongoDB/SQL connection strings with credentials
• Private keys: -----BEGIN (RSA|EC|OPENSSH) PRIVATE KEY-----

DOM XSS sinks (HIGH/MEDIUM):

• innerHTML\s*=, outerHTML\s*=, document\.write\(, document\.writeln\(
• eval\(, new Function\(, setTimeout\(['"``], setInterval\(['"``]
• location\.href\s*=, location\.replace\(, location\.assign\(
• location\.hash used as input without sanitization
• .html\(, .append\( with external data (jQuery sinks)
• dangerouslySetInnerHTML (React)
• postMessage without origin check pattern

Prototype pollution (MEDIUM):

• __proto__, constructor\[, Object\.assign\(.*user, merge\(.*user

Config/staging leaks (MEDIUM/LOW):

• Internal RFC-1918 IPs: 10\., 192\.168\., 172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.
• sourceMappingURL= (source map exposure)
• console\.log, debugger
• Staging/dev URLs: staging., dev., localhost, 127.0.0.1

Step 4b — Vulnerable JS library detection (retire.js)

Skip this step if setup reported [skip] npx not found.

Call the retire_scan tool with:

• base_url = TARGET_URL
• origin = TARGET_ORIGIN

retire.js downloads all <script src> files from the page into a temp directory, checks each file's library fingerprint against the retire.js vulnerability database, and returns JSON output.

Parse the retire.js JSON output. For each vulnerable library found:

• Extract: library name, detected version, vulnerability description, CVE IDs (if any)
• Assign severity:
  • CRITICAL: known RCE, authentication bypass, or CVE with CVSS ≥ 9.0
  • HIGH: XSS, CSRF, prototype pollution, or CVE with CVSS 7.0–8.9
  • MEDIUM: information disclosure, DoS, or CVE with CVSS 4.0–6.9
  • LOW: outdated with no known CVE but a newer version exists
• Flag the specific JS file URL where the library was detected

If retire.js returns no findings, note it as "no vulnerable libraries detected".

Step 5 — CORS testing

Call cors_probe with TARGET_URL and origin https://evil.attacker.com. Also call cors_probe against TARGET_ORIGIN/api and TARGET_ORIGIN/api/v1 if those returned non-404 in Step 2.

Flag if response contains:

• Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.attacker.com (HIGH)
• Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true (CRITICAL)
• Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * (MEDIUM)

Step 6 — Subdomain enumeration

Call dns_subdomains with TARGET_HOST.

For each discovered subdomain, call fetch_headers and check:

• HTTP status (alive vs dead)
• Technology headers
• CNAME pointing to external service with no response → flag as potential takeover (HIGH) (Common targets: s3.amazonaws.com, github.io, heroku.com, netlify.app, azurewebsites.net, pages.github.com, fastly.net, cloudfront.net)

Limit to first 20 subdomains to keep request volume low.

Report

After all steps complete, write the final report to client_side_pentest_report.md in the current working directory.

Report structure

• Executive summary — severity count table, top 3 highest-risk findings
• Scope and assumptions
• Methodology — detected OS, steps executed, tools used (curl, python3, requests, beautifulsoup4, retire.js if available)
• Asset inventory — subdomains found, JS files analyzed
• Findings — grouped CRITICAL → HIGH → MEDIUM → LOW → INFO
• False positives ruled out
• Remediation priorities — ordered by severity
• Appendix — raw evidence snippets, all probed paths and their status codes

Per-finding structure

• Title
• Severity
• CWE (if applicable)
• Affected asset
• Description
• Evidence (exact snippet or response)
• Reproduction steps
• Security impact
• Confidence (Confirmed / Likely / Informational)
• Remediation
• References