Pin github actions

Skill: pin-github-actions

Audits a repository's GitHub Actions and verifies that every action reference is pinned to a full-length commit SHA. Mutable tags (@v4, @v4.2.2) and branches (@main) can be silently repointed by whoever controls the upstream repo — the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (CVE-2025-30066, March 2025) repointed existing tags to a malicious commit that dumped CI secrets; only SHA-pinned consumers were unaffected. SHA pinning is the GitHub-recommended hardening and the OpenSSF Scorecard Pinned-Dependencies check.

Run this when asked to "check if actions are pinned", harden CI supply chain, or as the GitHub-Actions slice of a release/supply-chain audit (see the sibling skill release-audit).

Pinning rule

A reference is pinned only when the ref after @ is a full 40-hex-character git commit SHA, ideally followed by a comment naming the human-readable version:

uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2

(The SHA/version above only illustrates the format — never copy it; resolve the current SHA fresh via the Phase 3 commands.)

Reference form	Verdict
owner/repo@<40-hex-sha>	✅ pinned
owner/repo/path@<40-hex-sha> (action in subdir)	✅ pinned
owner/repo/.github/workflows/x.yml@<40-hex-sha> (reusable workflow)	✅ pinned
docker://image@sha256:<digest>	✅ pinned
owner/repo@v4 / @v4.2.2 (tag)	❌ mutable
owner/repo@main / @master (branch)	❌ mutable
docker://image:tag	❌ mutable
./.github/actions/foo (local, same repo)	✅ N/A — no pin needed

First-party actions/* and github/* are lower-risk but still in scope — pin them too (Scorecard makes no exception). If the team deliberately allows major-tag for first-party actions, record it as a documented exception, not a silent gap.

Phase 1 — Detect

Find every action reference across workflows and composite/local actions:

# Workflows + composite action definitions
grep -rEno '^[[:space:]]*-?[[:space:]]*uses:[[:space:]]*\S+' \
  .github/workflows .github/actions 2>/dev/null

Also scan action.yml / action.yaml anywhere in the repo (composite actions can uses: other actions).

Phase 2 — Classify & report

For each uses: line, strip any inline comment, take the ref after the last @, and classify it against the table above. A ref is pinned iff it matches ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ (or sha256: for docker://). Local ./ references need no pin.

Report findings as a table, sorted unpinned-first, with severity:

• High — third-party action pinned to a branch (@main) or a floating tag (@v4); fully attacker-controllable.
• Medium — third-party action pinned to an immutable-looking patch tag (@v4.2.2); still mutable in principle (tags can be force-moved).
• Low — first-party actions/* / github/* on a tag.
• OK / N/A — SHA-pinned, or local action.

File:line	Reference	Current ref	Verdict	Severity

End with a one-line summary: N references · M pinned · K unpinned.

Phase 3 — Fix (only when the user asks)

For each unpinned third-party reference, resolve the ref to its current SHA and rewrite in place, preserving the original version as a trailing comment:

# Resolve a tag/branch to its commit SHA
gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> --jq '.sha'
# Offline / no gh: git ls-remote https://github.com/<owner>/<repo> <ref>

Then edit the line to uses: owner/repo@<sha> # <original-ref>. Resolve the SHA from the upstream tag, not from a third-party mirror, and only after confirming the tag currently points where expected. Re-run Phase 1 to confirm zero unpinned references remain.

Phase 4 — Recommend automation & enforcement

SHA pins are static, so leave the repo a way to keep them current and to fail the build on regressions:

• Keep pins fresh — Dependabot updates SHA pins and the version comment automatically:

  # .github/dependabot.yml
  version: 2
  updates:
    - package-ecosystem: github-actions
      directory: "/"
      schedule: { interval: weekly }
  

  (Renovate's helpers:pinGitHubActionDigests preset is the equivalent.)
• Bulk-pin existing repos — pinact or ratchet pin rewrite all tags to SHAs in one pass.
• Enforce in CI — fail PRs that introduce unpinned actions, e.g. zgosalvez/github-actions-ensure-sha-pinned-actions (itself SHA-pinned), or OpenSSF Scorecard's Pinned-Dependencies check.

Sources

• GitHub — Security hardening for GitHub Actions: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#using-third-party-actions
• OpenSSF Scorecard — Pinned-Dependencies: https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#pinned-dependencies
• tj-actions/changed-files advisory (CVE-2025-30066): https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/security/advisories
• Dependabot for Actions: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/working-with-dependabot/keeping-your-actions-up-to-date-with-dependabot