Standing together against divide and conquer

Standing Together Against Divide and Conquer

What this skill is about, in one sentence: How to recognize when an adversary is breaking up a would-be coalition with a mix of rewards for defectors and punishments for hold-outs — and how to hold collective action together when every member's individual incentive is to cut their own deal.

Where this comes from

This skill distills Chapter 3 ("Divide and Conquer: Build Walls, Not Bridges") of Sonnenfeld & Tian's Trump's Ten Commandments (2025). Sonnenfeld draws on:

• Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels (1726) — the Lilliputians binding Gulliver with a network of small strings. Sonnenfeld frames Trump's view of opposing coalitions as exactly this scenario from the giant's perspective.
• Benjamin Franklin (attributed), 1776, signing the Declaration of Independence: "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately." Quoted by former University of Pennsylvania president Amy Gutmann in response to Trump's 2025 pressure on universities.
• Kurt Lewin, field theory and group dynamics (MIT, 1940s). Lewin's work on how in-group/ out-group boundaries form and dissolve under external pressure is the academic foundation.
• Herbert Kelman (Harvard, 1970s) — conflict-resolution research on "enlarging the scope of the problem" to make short-term concessions tolerable. Sonnenfeld invokes Kelman to explain the Abraham Accords as a constructive inversion of divide-and-conquer.
• Game-theoretic prisoner's dilemma — formalized by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher (RAND, 1950), popularized by Robert Axelrod's Evolution of Cooperation (1984). The defector-punisher structure of divide-and-conquer is a classic prisoner's dilemma with an external party setting the payoffs.

Primary source: false. Operators generalize to any attacker deploying the pattern against any would-be coalition.

North Star

Does this operator change what a coalition member or coalition leader actually does?

If an operator only helps a coalition understand the attacker's mindset but doesn't change who talks to whom, when, about what commitments, before when — cut it.

Opening Gate: is this divide-and-conquer against a coalition?

Three tests:

• Multiple targets, sequential attack. The attacker is hitting members of your group one at a time, not all at once.
• Differential treatment. Some members are being offered inducements (carrots), others threatened (sticks), based on perceived compliance.
• Attacker gains if you splinter. If each member cuts their own deal, the attacker's position is materially stronger than if you all held together.

If all three test positive, apply this skill. If only the third is true but the attack is simultaneous against all members, use conventional coalition-maintenance advice (the dynamics are different when everyone is under the same fire at the same time).

The Operators

1. carrot-and-stick-prisoners-dilemma

Plain English: The attacker uses a classic prisoner's-dilemma structure. Early defectors get carrots (favorable terms, praise, reprieve). Hold-outs get sticks (punishment, isolation, public attack). Every individual member's incentive is to cut their own deal fast, before others do.

Source: Sonnenfeld & Tian, Ch. 3. Cases: the 2025 attacks on major law firms (Paul Weiss settled; Jenner & Block / WilmerHale / Perkins Coie fought and got restraining orders); the pressure on Ivy League universities (Columbia settled under then-President Katrina Armstrong, who then resigned; Harvard under Alan Garber refused). Formal academic backing: Flood & Dresher (RAND, 1950); Axelrod (1984).

Detect:

• The attacker is publicly offering favorable treatment to some members while threatening others.
• Members who settle early are held up as examples.
• Members who resist are singled out for intensified pressure.
• There is no visible coordination mechanism among your peer group — each member is isolated in their decision.

Intent behind it: Break collective resolve by making individual defection rational at the margin, even when collective resistance would serve everyone's interests better.

Counter-move:

• Pre-commit collectively, publicly, before anyone capitulates. A coalition that has publicly bound itself cannot defect without bearing the reputational cost. Private understandings dissolve under pressure.
• If the coalition cannot pre-commit: identify the member most likely to resist (strongest financial position, most reputationally insulated) and support them publicly first. Once one member has credibly refused to settle, others can follow.
• If you are an individual member and the coalition has already splintered: your decision is now purely individual. Cut the best deal you can without pretending you have coalition leverage you don't.

Do not use when: members of your "coalition" have genuinely different interests that make collective action irrational — in which case the attacker is correctly reading that no real coalition exists.

2. collective-action-as-only-counter (the Ben Franklin operator)

Plain English: Against divide-and-conquer, individual negotiation is structurally losing. The only counter is collective action — a binding commitment by enough members of the group that defection becomes more costly than resistance.

Source: Sonnenfeld & Tian, Ch. 3 and the Conclusion. Amy Gutmann's invocation of Franklin's "hang together, hang separately" — quoted at a 2025 gathering of university presidents that Sonnenfeld helped convene in response to the Harvard pressure. Historical parallel: the 2017 CEO walkout from Trump's Presidential Business Advisory Councils after Charlottesville; the 2020 Business Leaders for National Unity statement certifying Biden's victory.

Detect: Not a detection operator — a response protocol.

Counter-move:

• Convene early. The 2017 Merck/Ken Frazier resignation triggered a stampede within hours. Delay kills coalitions.
• Commit publicly, not privately. Private pledges to resist dissolve; public joint statements don't. The 2020 CEO statement had six specific bullet points and 94 signatures in twelve hours.
• Use an existing convening body if you can, create one if you can't. Business Roundtable, industry associations, alumni groups, professional bodies. If no body exists, a single credible convener (one respected CEO, one university president) can create an ad-hoc coalition.
• Make defection visible. Once public commitments are on the record, members who break ranks are named. The reputational cost of named defection is usually what holds the line.

Do not use when: the group is too small or too internally divided to form any credible collective commitment. Trying and failing is worse than not trying.

3. target-the-weakest-member-first

Plain English: The attacker does not hit the strongest member of the group first. They pick the most vulnerable — the firm with the most client-flight risk, the university with the most recent leadership transition, the ally with the weakest domestic political standing. The sacrificial lamb's fall signals to everyone else that resistance is futile.

Source: Sonnenfeld & Tian, Ch. 3. The 2025 pattern: Paul, Weiss was targeted not because it was the worst offender but because it had led a peer-defense campaign (and partnership economics make law firms especially exposed to client-flight risk). Columbia was hit before Harvard because its leadership transition made it weaker.

Detect:

• The first target of an attack is often an odd choice on the apparent merits.
• The choice correlates more with vulnerability than with actual severity of the alleged offense.
• Adjacent members of the peer group are being told, explicitly or implicitly, "you could be next."

Intent behind it: Early capitulation from the weakest member sets the precedent. It breaks the group's assumption that resistance is viable.

Counter-move:

• Predict the next target. Who in your group is most vulnerable? That's probably who gets hit next. Pre-commit to defending them specifically.
• Surround the weakest member with stronger peers publicly. Make it clear that an attack on the weakest is an attack on the coalition, so the attacker cannot pick them off without confronting the whole.
• If you are the weakest member: recognize that resistance requires support you may not be able to mobilize on your own. Seek coalition backing before the attack lands.

Do not use when: the first target was genuinely chosen for their specific offense, and peers would not benefit from defending them.

4. wedge-issue-selection

Plain English: The attacker chooses issues that will fracture the coalition, not unify it. Sectoral tariff exemptions divide industries; selective praise of some members divides allies; doctrinal litmus tests divide intellectual coalitions.

Source: Sonnenfeld & Tian, Ch. 3. Cases: the shift between Trump's first and second terms in how tariffs were deployed — first term provoked unified CEO resistance (Charlottesville 2017); second term structured tariff exemptions industry-by-industry, fracturing the business community's response.

Detect:

• The attacker's pressure is calibrated to hit some members harder than others on each specific issue.
• Exemptions or reprieves are offered to some members but not others, on grounds that differ from member to member.
• Business Roundtable or equivalent convening bodies have gone silent or issued only "cursory statements" on the issue — a sign the coalition cannot form a unified position.

Intent behind it: Make the issue one on which members have genuinely different interests, so that any collective response is structurally impossible.

Counter-move:

• Identify the unifying frame early. Before negotiations, agree on a shared principle that all members can hold to — even if specific economic interests differ.
• Refuse selective exemptions publicly. "We will accept the same terms as all our peers" is a strong counter-pressure move, even when privately some members would benefit from accepting a favorable carve-out.
• If wedge issues cannot be avoided: accept that the coalition may fragment on this issue, but work to preserve it on the next. Don't let defection on one issue become a general pattern.

Do not use when: the members' interests are genuinely different and a unified position would require some to absorb real costs they haven't signed up for. Coalition maintenance has limits; asking members to bear unreciprocated costs dissolves the coalition from within.

5. alliance-attacks

Plain English: An attacker who relies on divide-and-conquer will systematically attack the alliances and institutions that could unify opposition — NATO, trade blocs, industry associations, bar associations, university consortia, political parties. The alliances themselves become targets.

Source: Sonnenfeld & Tian, Ch. 3. "Trump has never, in any sector, met an alliance he particularly liked." The book documents attacks on NATO, NAFTA/USMCA, the EU, the Business Roundtable (which was "all but missing in action" on tariffs), the Federalist Society.

Detect:

• The attacker is aiming at the infrastructure of collective response, not just at individual members.
• Industry associations, professional bodies, or multilateral institutions are being publicly delegitimized.
• Members are being pressured to withdraw from or defund the common institutions.

Intent behind it: Dismantling the machinery of collective action makes future coalition formation much harder, even before any specific attack.

Counter-move:

• Defend the institution, not just the issue. Public support for the legitimacy of the convening body (bar association, trade bloc, university consortium) is a pre-fight investment in future collective response capacity.
• If existing institutions are too compromised or captured: create parallel ones. The mid-2025 emergence of university-president joint statements is an example of ad-hoc institutional formation when existing bodies are too slow.
• Fund independent convening capacity. Institutions that depend on attacker-aligned funding cannot lead resistance. Membership dues, shared infrastructure, independent convening rooms matter more in an attack period than in a peaceful one.

Do not use when: the institution being attacked genuinely deserves reform — in which case the attack may be externally malicious but the internal grievances are real and should be addressed separately.

6. enlarge-the-pie-as-constructive-divide-and-conquer (the Abraham Accords operator)

Plain English: The divide-and-conquer pattern can be used constructively — to force neutral parties to pick a side, to isolate bad actors, and to create genuine alignment between parties with shared interests but legacy conflicts. The move is: expand the scope of the problem so that short-term concessions become tolerable because a much larger shared future is visible.

Source: Sonnenfeld & Tian, Ch. 3. The Abraham Accords (2020): Jared Kushner's work, building on the 2018 Bahrain Peace to Prosperity Summit, used divide-and-conquer logic to isolate Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah while creating a $50B economic development vision for Gulf states and the Palestinian territories. Academic foundation: Herbert Kelman's 1970s conflict-resolution research (Harvard).

Detect: This is a how-to operator, not a detection operator. Use when you are trying to build a coalition rather than defend one.

Counter-move: Not "counter" — this is the constructive use.

How to apply:

• Expand the frame. What larger, shared future is possible that makes short-term concessions tolerable? For the Abraham Accords, it was regional economic prosperity. For a domestic coalition, it might be a larger policy or market opportunity only accessible through unified action.
• Isolate the genuinely bad actors. Divide-and-conquer works because it forces neutrals to pick a side. Used constructively, it forces neutrals to pick against bad actors they had been ambiguously aligned with.
• Offer a credible positive vision. Kushner's $50B plan was specific (grants, low-interest loans, private investment; doubling the Palestinian economy; 1M new jobs; unemployment from 30% to single digits). Vague visions don't move parties off entrenched positions.

Do not use when: you don't have the actual resources to back the positive vision. Promising $50B of investment with no means to deliver is worse than promising nothing — it discredits the move permanently.

Final-answer structure

Judgment

• Is this divide-and-conquer? Which of the three opening-gate tests flagged?
• Is this a defensive situation (operators 1–5) or a constructive one (operator 6)?

What Would Change My Mind

• What would suggest the "coalition" has no real shared interests and should not be preserved?
• What would suggest the attacker is actually open to unified negotiation?

Next Action

• Concrete: who talks to whom, when, with what public commitment. Coalitions are built by specific people making specific commitments, not by generalities.

References

• references/source-notes.md — Ch. 3 mapping, Swift/Franklin/Lewin/Kelman lineage
• references/rejected-candidates.md — what was cut
• references/cases.md — Paul Weiss, Harvard, 2017 CEO walkout, 2020 BLNU statement, Abraham Accords