Security
Skill edenfunf/promptc/examples/bloated-demo/.claude/skills/security
Measure worst-case skill-context exposure in your Claude Code setup.
npx -y skills add edenfunf/promptc --skill securityAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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What its author says it does
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Project-wide security rules for handling untrusted input, secrets, and database access.
SKILL.md
1.6 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it
Security
SQL injection prevention
Always use parameterized queries for every database access. Never concatenate user-provided strings into SQL statements directly. This includes dynamic WHERE clauses, ORDER BY clauses, and table names.
Input validation
Validate and sanitize all user-provided data at the system boundary before it enters business logic. Reject inputs that do not match the expected shape, range, or type. Prefer allowlists over denylists for structured validation rules wherever possible.
Secrets handling
Secrets must never be committed to the repository under any circumstance. Use environment variables, a secrets manager, or a vault. Rotate any leaked credentials immediately and audit access logs after any disclosure event.
Logging
Never log secrets, personally identifiable information, or full request or response bodies. Scrub sensitive fields at the logging boundary using a structured logger. Use structured logging consistently across all services.
Authentication
Use well-audited authentication libraries; do not roll your own crypto. Rotate signing keys on a regular schedule. Expire idle sessions after a reasonable inactivity timeout.
Boundary discipline
Treat any data that crossed a network or process boundary as untrusted until proven otherwise. Apply the same scrutiny to data from other internal services as you would to data from the public internet. The threat model assumes lateral movement; act accordingly across every service-to-service hop in the system.