Done

done — the evidence gate

/done [what was being built, or a path to its spec/plan]

Answer one question: is there evidence this change works and does what was asked — or does it merely look finished? "The work looks done" is the weakest signal in agentic coding; this gate replaces it with quoted output and an independent review. It never makes the change better — it decides whether the change is ready.

Step 0 — Establish the yardstick

Identify the diff (uncommitted changes, or the branch vs its merge base) and the intent: the change folder's spec.md/plan.md if this came from the feature skill, the bug repro if from bugfix, otherwise ask the user for one sentence of "what was this supposed to do". No yardstick → the review below can only check correctness, not compliance; say so.

Step 1 — Evidence checklist

Copy this checklist into the response and fill it in as you go — every line gets quoted command output or an explicit ✗ with the reason. An unticked line with a reason is honest; a ticked line without evidence is the exact failure this skill exists to prevent.

- [ ] Full test suite: <command> → <pass/fail counts, verbatim tail>
- [ ] Lint / typecheck: <command> → <result>          (✗ if repo has none)
- [ ] Build: <command> → <result>                     (✗ if n/a)
- [ ] Ran the actual change: <command / flow> → <observed behavior>
- [ ] Diff hygiene: no debug prints (grep the diff for [DEBUG- — the tag
      bugfix leaves), no commented-out code, no stray files
- [ ] Tripwires (fake-green + source-security, below): clean

"Ran the actual change" is the line agents skip and humans value most: a green suite proves the tests pass, not that the feature works. Execute the spec's end-to-end check — start the app, curl the endpoint, run the CLI on real input — and report what actually happened. On auth, payment, or data-migration surfaces, "ran the change" means the failure path too, not just the happy one — an expired or tampered token is rejected, a declined card and a replayed webhook are handled, a migration's rollback is actually run — because that's where these surfaces break. Happy-path evidence alone on one of those surfaces can't reach SHIP: it's incomplete evidence (→ FIX FIRST, or NEEDS HUMAN when the missing check is a judgment call).

Fake-green tripwires — scan the diff itself; any hit is called out loudly and blocks a SHIP verdict until the user rules on it:

• an existing test modified or deleted in the same diff that makes it pass
• new skip / xfail / .only / commented-out assertions
• new TODOs or "temporary" workarounds standing in for the actual behavior
• assertions hardcoded to the current output rather than the intended behavior
• a test whose expected value is recomputed the way the code computes it — expected values come from an independent source of truth

Source-security tripwires — the source-side twin of the block above: scan the diff for a catastrophe pattern shipped into the code, not a faked test. Same rule — any hit is called out loudly with the file:line and blocks a SHIP verdict until the user rules on it. This is a scan of the diff, not an audit of the repo: a pattern the change doesn't introduce isn't a finding. Some clauses below are missing-safeguard ones — no tested rollback, no signature check — where the safeguard may live in an unchanged file; there the tripwire fires on the dangerous operation the diff does introduce, and the user's ruling is where a safeguard already present elsewhere gets confirmed.

• Secrets in source — an API key, token, password, or private key in a committed file (not .env, not a placeholder); an OAuth or signing secret anywhere but a secret manager.
• Injection — a SQL query built by string-concatenation with user-controlled input (no parameterization / ORM escaping); a shell command assembled from user input via exec/spawn/eval; a template rendered with unescaped user input where XSS is reachable.
• Auth bypass — a middleware check with a path that skips it (early return, swallowed exception, condition that always resolves to "authenticated"); a role or permission check forgeable by a request parameter; a JWT accepted with alg: none or verified against a secret hardcoded in source.
• Payment / webhook — a handler that swallows errors silently (empty catch, unhandled rejection); a webhook with no signature verification; an amount or recipient derived from untrusted input without server-side validation.
• Destructive data — a migration with a DROP or destructive ALTER and no tested rollback; a bulk delete or update with no WHERE or a user-controlled one; a cache or store wipe with no restore path.
• Plaintext sensitive data — a password or PII logged or stored unencrypted; an SSN, payment card, or health field in an unencrypted column.

Step 2 — Fresh-context review (two stages, one sub-agent each)

Preflight first: confirm the yardstick resolves and the diff is non-empty — reviewers fanned out on a wrong ref or an empty diff are pure waste. Then spawn reviewers that see only the diff plus the yardstick — not this conversation. A reviewer with no memory of writing the code has no loyalty to it. Run both concurrently:

1. Spec compliance: does the diff do what the spec/intent asked — fully, and nothing beyond it? Unrequested changes are findings (scope creep), missing acceptance criteria are findings. Returns: covered / missing / out-of-scope, each tied to a spec line — by decision/assumption ID (D2, A1) when the spec numbers them — and a diff location.
2. Correctness: bugs only — logic errors, unhandled edge cases, broken callers, concurrency/resource hazards. Instruct it explicitly: "report only defects that affect behavior; style, naming, and architecture preferences are out of scope." (Unbounded reviewers always find something; that way lies over-engineering.)

Every finding — from either stage or the second opinion below — quotes the diff lines that motivate it. A finding that can't quote its evidence is reported as unverified: on the record, but it never blocks the verdict. (Phantom findings — confident claims about code that isn't in the diff — are the reviewer-side twin of fake-green.)

Second opinion — optional, cross-model: if another model's agent CLI is installed (command -v codex, command -v gemini — checked separately, since one exit code for both false-negatives when only one exists; also check ~/.local/bin, which non-login shells often drop from PATH), invoke it by the path detection found — a CLI discovered in ~/.local/bin won't resolve by bare name — and run it as one more correctness reviewer with exactly the same inputs and instructions — the diff, the yardstick, the "style is out of scope" line — e.g. codex exec "Review only the diff below — do not read skill definitions, .claude/, or other repo files. Report defects that affect behavior... <diff>". The leading boundary line matters: an unscoped reviewer wanders off into whatever else it finds in the repo. Bound the call with a timeout (~5 min); a timeout or error means second opinion unavailable — note it in the gate and move on, never retry, and never substitute a same-model stand-in (a Claude sub-agent isn't outside). Fresh context removes loyalty to the code; a different model removes shared blind spots — a same-model reviewer tends to miss what the author missed, and LLM judges measurably favor their own model's output. No such CLI on the PATH → skip this layer and note it; never install one for it.

Weigh the findings — a reviewer can be wrong; check disputed claims against the code before accepting them. Don't silently drop any finding: each one is accepted (→ fix list) or rejected (with the reason). Cross-model findings carry two extra rules: agreement (both models flag it independently) is near-certain — accept it; and the gate rejecting the other model's behavior-affecting finding is itself the material disagreement — silence from one reviewer isn't consent, and the local model overruling its cross-model critic re-creates the self-judging this layer exists to break. That rejection isn't the gate's to make: route the finding to NEEDS HUMAN.

Step 3 — Verdict, then ship

One of three, stated plainly with the reasons:

• SHIP — evidence complete (including the failure-path check on any auth/payment/migration surface), tripwires clean — fake-green and source-security — and no accepted findings.
• FIX FIRST — the accepted findings, as a short ordered list. Fix them (or hand back to feature/bugfix), then re-run only the affected lines of the gate — not the whole ceremony.
• NEEDS HUMAN — a judgment call the gate can't make: a tripwire the user must rule on, a spec ambiguity, a disputed reviewer finding (including a cross-model split), a trade-off.

On SHIP (human-in-the-loop, in this order):

1. Draft the commit message per the repo's convention — read CLAUDE.md / recent git log for the house style. Commit.
2. Ask before push / PR — never push or open a PR unprompted. If a PR is wanted, the body is the spec's summary + the evidence checklist (a reviewer who sees the proof reviews faster).
3. If this change came from a feature folder: move out/dev/<change>/ to out/dev/archive/.
4. One-line retro (optional but offered): if the session surfaced a recurring agent mistake — a convention repeatedly missed, a check repeatedly forgotten — suggest the one-line CLAUDE.md rule or lint that would make it impossible next time. Harness engineering beats repetition; the tune skill runs this same audit at scale across past sessions.

Auto mode — under autopilot

Driven by the autopilot skill, the gate's logic is unchanged — only the waiting is removed: the run's itemized charter (not a question) governs commit, push, and PR, and a NEEDS HUMAN verdict parks the change with its findings on the record instead of blocking on a conversation. The gate still never fixes, and evidence rules still apply — auto mode changes who's waiting, not what's proven.

Guardrails

• Evidence over claims. No verdict without running things. If nothing can be run (no tests, no build, no entry point), say so and mark the verdict NEEDS HUMAN — never SHIP on inspection alone.
• The gate doesn't fix. Finding-then-quietly-fixing hides the finding; fixes happen after the verdict, on the record, then re-gate.
• Fresh context is the point. The sub-agent isolation is what makes stage 2 honest.
• Correctness only in review. Style debates are for humans who enjoy them, not shipping gates.
• A second model is another reviewer, not an arbiter. Its findings enter the same accept/reject triage with no extra weight; no model's verdict — local or cross — outranks the test suite.
• Never push without a yes. Committing locally is reversible; pushing and PRs are announcements.