Incident postmortem
Skill dayfinggg/claude-code-codex-skills/codex/skills/incident-postmortem
Drop-in Agent Skills, subagents, output styles, hooks & config templates for Claude Code (~/.claude) and OpenAI Codex CLI (~/.codex). Copy, restart, done.
npx -y skills add dayfinggg/claude-code-codex-skills --skill incident-postmortemAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
2 things to look at
- 17 days oldThe repository was created 17 days ago. New is not bad, but a brand new repository carrying a familiar-sounding name is the shape a typosquat arrives in, and there has been no time for anyone else to find a problem with it.
- 1 stars1 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.
What its author says it does
Copied from the file, not written here
Create an evidence-backed, blameless postmortem after a production incident has stabilized. Use for material outages, degradation, data loss, emergency rollback, manual intervention, or monitoring failure. Do not use during active response or for routine failed deployments; do not operate production unless separately authorized.
SKILL.md
3.7 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it
Incident Postmortem
Turn incident evidence into shared understanding and corrective actions that reduce recurrence, detection time, and recovery time.
Confirm the boundary
- Verify that the incident is stabilized before conducting the full review.
- During an active incident, preserve timestamps, commands, alerts, graphs, deployments, logs, and decisions without distracting responders.
- Do not operate production, contact people, publish the postmortem, or create tracker items without explicit authorization.
- Protect secrets, personal data, customer data, and privileged operational details.
Establish the evidence
- Use a single declared timezone and precise timestamps.
- Gather monitoring data, logs, traces, deploy and configuration history, tickets, communication records, and relevant code changes.
- Separate observed facts, credible inferences, and unknowns.
- Quantify impact only from defensible evidence: affected users or requests, duration, data integrity, regions, products, and business consequences.
- If the technical cause remains uncertain, route the unresolved investigation to
diagnosing-bugs.
Reconstruct the timeline
- Cover the first known contributing condition, trigger, detection, escalation, diagnosis, mitigation, recovery, and confirmation.
- Include important decision points and the information available at the time.
- Distinguish incident duration from time to detect, acknowledge, mitigate, and fully recover.
- Do not fill timeline gaps with invented precision.
Analyze causes and defenses
- Separate the triggering event, proximate technical cause, and contributing systemic conditions.
- Examine design assumptions, dependencies, change controls, capacity, observability, runbooks, testing, access, and recovery mechanisms where evidence makes them relevant.
- Identify what worked, what failed, where responders relied on luck, and whether the pattern has happened before.
- Avoid stopping at operator error. Explain why the system allowed an ordinary human action or expected failure to cause the observed impact.
Create durable actions
- Prefer actions that prevent the failure, detect it earlier, limit blast radius, or shorten recovery.
- Give each action a measurable end state and evidence of completion.
- Assign an owner, priority, and due date only when the organization or user provides them; otherwise mark them as decisions still needed.
- Reject vague actions such as “be more careful,” “monitor closely,” or training without a concrete system change.
- Keep the action set small enough to finish and trace every action to a documented contributing factor.
- Use
to-ticketsonly when the user requests a backlog or external work items.
Write blamelessly
- Describe decisions in the context of the information, incentives, interfaces, and safeguards that existed at the time.
- Name systems and conditions rather than blaming individuals.
- Preserve accountability through clear facts, ownership of follow-up, and verification of corrective work.
- Record disputed claims and missing evidence explicitly.
Completion standard
A postmortem is complete when it states the impact, evidence-backed timeline, cause and contributing conditions, effective and failed defenses, and a bounded set of measurable corrective actions without inventing facts or assigning personal blame.