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Common llm security

Skill ComeOnOliver/skillshub/skills/HoangNguyen0403/agent-skills-standard/common-llm-security

OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) audit checklist for AI applications, agent tools, RAG pipelines, and prompt construction. Load during any security review touching LLM client code, prompt templates, agent tools, or vector stores. (triggers: LLM security, prompt injection, agent security, RAG security, AI security, openai, anthropic, langchain, LLM review)From its SKILL.md

Install
npx -y skills add ComeOnOliver/skillshub --skill common-llm-security

Assembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.

SKILL.md

2.7 KB, 563 tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it

OWASP LLM Top 10 Security Checklist (2025)

Priority: P0 (CRITICAL)

Implementation Guidelines

  • Check LLM01 first: Prompt injection is the #1 LLM finding — any user input concatenated directly into a prompt string is an immediate P0.
  • Check LLM06 next: Agent tools with write/delete/execute capabilities without confirmation are P0.
  • Mark each item: ✅ not affected | ⚠️ needs review | 🔴 confirmed finding.
  • P0 finding caps Security score at 40/100 — do not skip any item.
  • See references/owasp-llm.md for full detection signals.

OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025)

IDRiskKey Detection Signal
LLM01Prompt InjectionUser input string-concatenated into prompt. Retrieved docs inserted into system turn.
LLM02Sensitive Information DisclosurePII or credentials passed into prompt context. LLM response logged without redaction.
LLM03Supply ChainUnverified model weights or plugins. Third-party agent added without trust review.
LLM04Data & Model PoisoningUser-controlled data written to training sets or embedding stores without validation.
LLM05Improper Output HandlingLLM output used directly in DOM sink, SQL query, shell command, or redirect URL.
LLM06Excessive AgencyAgent tool with write/delete/network access — no human-in-the-loop confirmation.
LLM07System Prompt LeakageSystem prompt content returned via tool output, error message, or API response.
LLM08Vector & Embedding WeaknessesUser text injected into vector store without sanitization. No tenant namespace isolation.
LLM09MisinformationLLM output used for critical decisions (medical, financial, legal) without verification.
LLM10Unbounded ConsumptionNo max_tokens on LLM call. No rate limit on invocations. Agent loop without depth cap.

Anti-Patterns

  • No prompt concat: Pass user input as a separate user turn, never interpolated into system prompts.
  • No raw LLM output in sinks: Sanitize LLM responses before writing to DOM, queries, or shell.
  • No uncapped agent loops: Every agentic recursion must enforce a max iteration/depth limit.

References

What ships with it

Read from the repository

Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.

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