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Security audit

Skill ComeOnOliver/skillshub/skills/aiskillstore/marketplace/clementwalter/security-audit

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Install
npx -y skills add ComeOnOliver/skillshub --skill security-audit

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Security review or audit of code, architecture, or infrastructure - Threat modeling sessions - Reviewing PRs for security implications

SKILL.md

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Security Researcher

Senior-grade security review guidelines anchored on canonical control frameworks: NIST CSF 2.0, CIS Controls v8, NIST SSDF, OWASP ASVS, OWASP Top 10, MITRE ATT&CK, SLSA, and OpenSSF Scorecard.

When to Use

  • Security review or audit of code, architecture, or infrastructure
  • Threat modeling sessions
  • Reviewing PRs for security implications
  • Assessing supply chain security
  • Smart contract or ZK circuit security reviews

Frameworks Reference

FrameworkPurpose
NIST CSF 2.0Org-wide risk outcomes
CIS Controls v8Practical enterprise controls
NIST SSDF SP 800-218Secure development lifecycle
OWASP ASVSApp security requirements
OWASP Top 10 (2025)Common web app failures
MITRE ATT&CKAdversary techniques mapping
SLSA + OpenSSFSupply chain integrity

Non-Negotiables

Before any deep review, verify these fundamentals:

  1. Asset inventory - Systems, repos, secrets locations, dependencies, owners
  2. MFA everywhere - Hardware keys for admins, no shared accounts
  3. Patch management - Continuous vuln scanning (OS, containers, deps)
  4. Centralized logging - Auth, privilege changes, egress, CI/CD, key access
  5. Tested backups - Restore drills, immutable where possible
  6. Incident response - Runbooks, on-call, break-glass procedures

Review Methodology

1. Threat Model First

Use STRIDE categories:

  • Spoofing - Can attacker impersonate?
  • Tampering - Can data be modified?
  • Repudiation - Can actions be denied?
  • Information disclosure - Data leaks?
  • Denial of service - Availability attacks?
  • Elevation of privilege - Unauthorized access?

Document for each trust boundary:

  • Auth strategy
  • Data classification
  • Rate limits
  • Audit requirements

Assume compromise review:

  • If one service key leaks, what's the blast radius?
  • If one dependency is malicious, what stops it?

2. Identity & Access (Root Cause #1)

Broken access control is the most common vulnerability.

Check:

  • Default-deny authorization (by resource, not just endpoint)
  • Short-lived sessions, secure cookies, CSRF protection
  • Separation: authentication ≠ authorization ≠ accounting
  • Step-up auth for high-risk actions
  • RBAC/ABAC with explicit admin boundaries

Protect against:

  • Credential stuffing (rate limits, breached password checks)
  • Account takeover (MFA, risky-login alerts)
  • Session fixation/replay (rotation, binding, nonce/jti)

3. Secrets & Keys

  • No secrets in git - Pre-receive hooks, CI secret detectors
  • Dedicated KMS/HSM - Least privilege, rotate keys
  • Environment separation - Dev/stage/prod with separate creds
  • Short-lived credentials - OIDC to cloud, not static keys
  • Track usage - Who/what accessed, from where, when
  • Compromise playbook - Rotate, revoke, invalidate, postmortem

4. Cryptography

  • Use modern primitives (AEAD, not raw AES modes)
  • Never roll your own crypto
  • CSPRNG for randomness (no time-based seeds)
  • Unique nonces where required
  • Constant-time ops for secret-dependent paths
  • Domain separation for hashes
  • Passwords: argon2/bcrypt/scrypt, per-user salt

5. Input Handling & Injection

  • Strict allowlists, schema validation at boundaries
  • Parameterized queries (no string concatenation)
  • Contextual output encoding (HTML/JS/URL)
  • SSRF prevention: egress allowlists, metadata IP blocks
  • Deserialization: avoid unsafe deserializers, type allowlists
  • File uploads: content-type defense, store outside web root

6. Infrastructure

  • Asset inventory + secure baseline (golden images)
  • Patch SLAs with emergency path
  • Network segmentation (prod ≠ CI/CD ≠ corp)
  • mTLS for service-to-service
  • Rate limits, quotas, circuit breakers
  • No public admin panels (VPN + MFA + IP allowlists)

7. CI/CD & Supply Chain

Protect the build pipeline like prod:

  • Least privilege runners
  • Secrets only in protected contexts
  • Reviews for workflow changes

Dependencies:

  • Pin versions, verify integrity, monitor CVEs
  • Remove abandoned libs

Supply chain:

  • Signed build provenance
  • OpenSSF Scorecard checks
  • SLSA levels adoption

8. Detection & Response

Log with context:

  • Auth events, privilege changes, key access
  • Config changes, CI/CD events, unusual egress

Protect logs:

  • Append-only/immutable, restricted access

Alerting:

  • Brute force, impossible travel, new admin grants
  • Anomalous token use

Readiness:

  • Tabletop exercises, forensic snapshots, kill switches
  • Post-incident RCA, patch bug classes

9. Verification

  • Code review with security checklists
  • SAST + dependency + secret scanning in CI
  • DAST for critical surfaces
  • Fuzzers on parsers, codecs, serialization
  • Abuse case testing (rate limits, replay, permission boundaries)
  • External audits for high-risk components
  • Bug bounty when mature

Blockchain/Smart Contract Specifics

Protocol & Contracts

  • Invariant-first design - Define safety properties, check continuously
  • Upgradeability - Timelocks, emergency pause, clear admin key story
  • Oracle/bridge threats - Assume counterpart compromise, minimize trust
  • Economic attacks - MEV, sandwiching, griefing, liquidity manipulation
  • Replay protection - Chain-id, contract address, nonce, EIP-712
  • Key custody - Multisig, HSM, threshold signing

ZK Circuits/Provers

  • Soundness - Constraints fully bind witness, no unchecked values
  • Transcript binding - All public inputs in Fiat-Shamir transcript
  • Range/overflow - Explicit range constraints, no wrap assumptions
  • Challenges - Derive from transcript, never external mutable sources
  • Trusted setup - Ceremony hygiene, reproducible parameters
  • Side-channels - Constant-time for secrets, isolate prover infra

Operationalization

  1. Pick baselines: CIS v8 + NIST SSDF + OWASP ASVS
  2. Map to ATT&CK: What you can't detect, redesign
  3. Supply chain: SLSA + Scorecard for repos
  4. Loop: Threat model → Controls → Test → Monitor → Drills

Output Format

When conducting a review, structure findings as:

## Finding: [Title]
**Severity**: Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info
**Category**: [STRIDE category or framework reference]
**Location**: [File:line or component]

### Description
[What's wrong]

### Impact
[What could happen]

### Recommendation
[How to fix]

### References
[Framework links, CVE, etc.]

See references/ for detailed checklists by domain.

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