Security rotate leak

Skill — rotate a leaked secret

Activates when the user has discovered (or you've discovered) that a production credential is in the repo, the chat, or git history. The clock is running — every hour the value sits exposed is another hour an attacker has to find it.

When to fire

• User says "I leaked X" / "I accidentally pushed Y" / "X is in git history" / "is this secret bad?"
• The scanner (or ai-bodyguard hook) just flagged a hardcoded secret.
• User pastes a high-entropy string and asks "should I rotate this?"
• A /scan --secrets run produces a critical-severity hit.
• User mentions they're "rotating keys" or "doing a credential reset."

What to do — sequenced, do not skip steps

1. DO NOT print the leaked value back. Mask it to first-4 + last-4 chars in any output. The chat transcript itself becomes part of the blast radius.

2. Detect the provider from the prefix:

   • sk_live_…, rk_live_… → Stripe
   • sk-…, sk-proj-… → OpenAI
   • sk-ant-… → Anthropic
   • ghp_…, github_pat_… → GitHub PAT
   • xoxb-…, xoxa-…, xoxp-… → Slack
   • AKIA… → AWS access key (16 chars after prefix)
   • AIza… → Google API key
   • JWT with role: service_role claim → Supabase service-role
   • Service-account JSON (type: "service_account") → GCP

3. Print the EXACT revoke URL for that provider's console. Don't paraphrase — copy from this canonical list:

   Provider	Revoke at
   OpenAI	https://platform.openai.com/api-keys
   Anthropic	https://console.anthropic.com/settings/keys
   GitHub PAT	https://github.com/settings/tokens
   Slack	https://api.slack.com/apps → your app → OAuth & Permissions → Revoke
   AWS access key	https://console.aws.amazon.com/iam/home#/security_credentials
   Google API key	https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials
   Supabase service-role	https://supabase.com/dashboard/project/_/settings/api
   GCP service account	https://console.cloud.google.com/iam-admin/serviceaccounts
   Stripe	https://dashboard.stripe.com/apikeys

4. Estimate blast radius BEFORE the rotation, not after:

   • Stripe = real money. Check dashboard for unauthorized charges in the last 24h BEFORE rotating.
   • AWS = potential crypto-mining bills. Check Billing → Cost Explorer.
   • Supabase service-role = bypasses every RLS rule. Audit the audit_log table for anomalous reads since the value first appeared.
   • GitHub PAT = potential pushes / forks / settings changes.

5. Run the active rotation if the user agrees: /fix --rotate-secret --auto. This is the only command that touches the provider's API for you. Without --auto, surface the manual steps and stop.

6. Add --scrub-history if the value is in git history. Rewrites history via git filter-repo or BFG. Note: irreversible, requires force-push to a shared branch — do NOT run without explicit user confirmation.

7. Propose the next step: /fix --vault to migrate the rest of the project's env-var surface to a real secrets manager so this doesn't happen again.

Don't

• Don't print the leaked value back to the user un-masked.
• Don't run --scrub-history without explicit confirmation. It's irreversible and breaks every clone of the repo.
• Don't tell the user to "rotate it later" — every minute counts.
• Don't add the new value to chat. Ask the user to paste it directly into .env or push it via the deployment platform's CLI.

Canonical commands

• /fix --rotate-secret — guided rotation steps for the detected provider
• /fix --rotate-secret --auto — end-to-end (revoke + scrub + push replacement)
• /fix --rotate-secret --auto --scrub-history — also purge from git history
• /fix --vault — migrate to Doppler / Infisical / platform secrets