Threat model
Skill bromso/metapowers/plugins/security/skills/threat-model
A Claude Code plugin that adds an agentic skills framework, with MCP's and a meta prompting processes. Inspired by "Superpowers" & "Figma Console MCP", but not just for development or design; but for all aspect within the digital production cycle.
npx -y skills add bromso/metapowers --skill threat-modelAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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Model threats using STRIDE, PASTA, or attack trees
SKILL.md
3.6 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it
Threat Model
Model threats for "$ARGUMENTS" using structured threat modeling methodologies. Identify what can go wrong, assess each threat's severity, and propose mitigations.
Prerequisites
Read .metapowers/security/$ARGUMENTS/00-govern.md. If this file does not exist, tell the user:
Phase 0 (Govern) has not been completed for "$ARGUMENTS". Run a Govern skill first (e.g.,
/security:security-policy $ARGUMENTS), or use--skip-checksto bypass.
If --skip-checks is present in $ARGUMENTS, skip this check and log to .metapowers/security/$ARGUMENTS/skip-log.md.
Process
-
Read context files:
- Read
plugins/security/shared/threat-model-template.mdfor methodology reference and output structure - Read
.metapowers/security/$ARGUMENTS/00-govern.mdfor organizational context and risk appetite
- Read
-
Describe the system being modeled:
- Define the system or component scope (application, service, infrastructure, data flow)
- Identify key actors: end users, administrators, external services, automated processes
- List technologies and protocols in use
- Document assumptions about the environment (network segmentation, authentication mechanisms, hosting model)
-
Draw data flow diagram (text-based):
- Identify processes, data stores, external entities, and data flows
- Use text-based notation to represent the diagram (e.g.,
[User] --> (Web App) --> [Database]) - Mark trust boundaries between different security zones (public internet, DMZ, internal network, database tier)
- Label each flow with the data type and protocol
-
Apply STRIDE to each component:
- For each element in the data flow, systematically evaluate:
- Spoofing — can an attacker impersonate a legitimate user or system?
- Tampering — can data be modified in transit or at rest without detection?
- Repudiation — can an actor deny performing an action without proof?
- Information Disclosure — can sensitive data be exposed to unauthorized parties?
- Denial of Service — can the component be rendered unavailable?
- Elevation of Privilege — can an attacker gain higher access than authorized?
- Document each identified threat with ID, description, affected component, and STRIDE category
- For each element in the data flow, systematically evaluate:
-
Rate each threat by likelihood and impact:
- Likelihood (1-5): based on attack complexity, required access, and known exploitation
- Impact (1-5): based on data sensitivity, business criticality, and blast radius
- Risk score = likelihood x impact
- Categorize: Critical (20-25), High (12-19), Medium (6-11), Low (1-5)
- Prioritize threats by risk score for mitigation planning
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Write the artifact to
.metapowers/security/$ARGUMENTS/01-identify.mdwith heading:Threat Model
Include sections:
- System Description — scope, actors, technologies, and assumptions
- Data Flow Diagram — text-based diagram with trust boundaries
- Threat Catalog — all identified threats with STRIDE classification and risk score
- Threat Prioritization — ranked list by risk score
- Proposed Mitigations — recommended controls for each high and critical threat
Output
The threat model written to .metapowers/security/$ARGUMENTS/01-identify.md. Present a summary to the user highlighting:
- System scope and trust boundaries identified
- Total threats found by STRIDE category
- Top critical and high-risk threats
- Recommended mitigations for the highest-priority threats