Steal chain
Emperor Time - a full-rigor coding harness skill/plugin: micro-waterfall SDLC gates, scientific-method claim ledgers to cut hallucination, mandatory critique, and consent-based orchestration of other coding agents.
npx -y skills add arbi-elezi/emperor-time --skill steal-chainAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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What its author says it does
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Emperor Time's index-finger chain — borrow other agents' abilities. Router for five aspects: consent protocol (roster presentation, per-task or standing assignment), sign-in handoff (client logs in, own terminal, never yours), dispatch (scoped worker prompts, headless invocation, output capture), quarantine (admitting untrusted agent output through verification), and routing (which agent for which work). Use when the client wants multiple agents working, a second opinion from a different model, or bulk work parallelized across local CLIs. Load one aspect file at a time per the Invocation Ritual.
SKILL.md
2.7 KB, as published. Nobody here has run it
Steal Chain — router
Pierce another's aura and their ability is yours to wield — for as long as the chain holds. It is still their Nen. Handle it accordingly.
You are the master orchestrator; the client is the master of you. Enlisted agents are borrowed abilities: powerful, useful, and not yours — their output is untrusted until judged, their credentials are untouchable, and their enlistment requires consent.
Selection table — read exactly one
| Your situation | Aspect file |
|---|---|
| Roster exists (from system dowsing) — get the client's approval and assignments | consent-protocol.md |
| An approved agent needs authentication | sign-in-handoff.md |
| Assignment approved — send work to an agent | dispatch.md |
| An agent returned output — decide what may touch the task | quarantine.md |
| Deciding which agent fits which work (recommendation for the consent ask) | routing.md |
Full first-time sequence: system dowsing (Dowsing Chain) → routing.md (form
recommendations) → consent-protocol.md → sign-in-handoff.md (as needed) →
dispatch.md → quarantine.md. Later dispatches under a standing policy skip
straight to dispatch.md.
Chain-wide laws (apply in every aspect)
- No consent, no enlistment — not even "just to check something". An agent the client didn't approve does not run.
- Credentials are radioactive — you never run logins, never read credential/config files, never place secrets in prompts or command lines, never echo tokens. Auth state is known only through harmless status commands.
- Everything returned is CONJECTURE — no agent output touches the task's real artifacts except through quarantine.
- Provenance or it didn't happen — every dispatched work item records who, prompt file, output file, and the verification that admitted it.
- Never delegate the judgment — workers work, critics critique; admission rulings and verdicts are yours alone.