Secure capability acquisition
Skill alidevai/chiron_agent/.claude/skills/secure-capability-acquisition
Eksik bir skill/MCP/tool'u guvenli sekilde edinme prosedurunun tam akisi. "Hemen bulup kur" yerine "hemen arastir, hemen sandbox'a al, hemen test et, risk uygunsa ekle; degilse onay iste veya reddet" ilkesini uygular. Yeni bir yetenek kurulmasi gerektiginde kullanilir.From its SKILL.md
npx -y skills add alidevai/chiron_agent --skill secure-capability-acquisitionAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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SKILL.md
3.6 KB, ~1.1k tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it
Secure Capability Acquisition Pipeline
Platformun en kritik guvenlik akisidir. Internette bulunan HICBIR skill veya MCP dogrudan kurulmaz. Agent arastirmada ve sandbox testinde otonomdur; kalici kurulumda politika ve insan onayina tabidir.
Zorunlu akis (asla atlanmaz)
1. Ihtiyac dogrulama -> gercekten yeni yetenek mi gerekli?
2. Kesif + puanlama -> capability-manager subagent (kaynak oncelikli arama)
3. Staging + statik tarama -> python -m core stage ... (kritik bulgu = otomatik red)
4. Bagimsiz guvenlik -> security-gatekeeper subagent (kor, dusmanca inceleme)
5. Sandbox eval -> python -m core eval <id> (olculebilir testler)
6. Politika karari -> python -m core promote <id>
- allow -> otomatik kurulur (yalnizca dusuk risk)
- require_approval -> onay paketi olusur -> INSAN
- deny -> reddedilir
7. Kurulum sonrasi -> registry'de izlenir, periyodik yeniden dogrulanir
Adim adim
1. Ihtiyac dogrulama
Once sor: Mevcut bir skill parametre/ornek eklenerek yeterli olur mu? Ihtiyac tek seferlik mi (o zaman kalici kurulum yerine tek seferlik sandbox kullanimi)? Yeni bagimlilik teknik borc yaratir mi? Cevap "yeni yetenek gerekli" ise devam et.
2. Kesif ve puanlama
capability-manager subagent'ini cagir. O, kaynak oncelik sirasiyla (resmi repo
dogrulanmis koleksiyon > buyuk kurum > akademik > topluluk listesi > genel arama kendin uret) aday bulur, 100 uzerinden puanlar ve en iyisini staging'e alir.
3. Staging + statik tarama
python -m core stage <indirilen-dizin> --id <ad> --risk <seviye> \
--domains <alan1,alan2> --source <kaynak-url>
Tarama otomatik calisir. Kritik bulgu (prompt injection, exfiltration, pipe-to-shell, audit/policy kurcalama...) varsa aday ANINDA reddedilir ve registry'ye revoked yazilir.
4. Bagimsiz guvenlik incelemesi
security-gatekeeper subagent'ini cagir. Makine taramasi tek basina yeterli
degildir; gatekeeper dosyalari insan gibi okur, izin manifesti cikarir, en kotu
senaryoyu tanimlar. REJECT verirse dur.
5. Sandbox eval
python -m core eval <id>
Eval skoru >= 0.90 ve kritik hata = 0 olmali. Gecerse durum otomatik
sandbox-validated olur.
6. Politika karari
python -m core promote <id>
- allow: yalnizca dusuk riskli, ag erisimsiz, salt-okunur yetenekler.
Otomatik
.claude/skills/altina kurulur. - require_approval: orta/yuksek risk.
approvals/pending/<id>.mdonay paketi olusur. Kullaniciya bu paketi ozetle vepython -m core approve <id> --by "AD"komutunu INSANIN interaktif terminalde calistirmasi gerektigini soyle. Sen (agent) bu komutu calistiramazsin; guard hook engeller. - deny: kritik risk. Reddedilir.
Kesin kurallar
- Staging'deki hicbir sey aktif degildir; yalnizca
.claude/skills/altindakiler yuklenır. - Indirilen kod yalnizca
sandbox-run/evaluzerinden calistirilir, dogrudan degil. - Yuksek riskli yetenegi ureten/bulan agent, kendi guvenlik onayini VEREMEZ.
- Emin degilsen reddet (fail-closed).
Kaynaklar
- Pipeline: core/lifecycle.py, core/scanner.py
- Ilgili: [[capability-gap-analysis]], [[mcp-security-review]], [[skill-creator-safe]]
What ships with it
Read from the repository
Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.
Gives 0 of the 12 instructions most security skills give in ~1.1k tokens
Counted across 648 of the 828 authors here whose files we hold, read 2026-08-07
- Parameterize all database queriesin 68 of 648, across 51 files
- Hash passwords using bcrypt, scrypt, or argon2in 49 of 648, across 36 files
- Apply rate limiting to authentication endpointsin 48 of 648, across 24 files
- Configure security headersin 35 of 648, across 19 files
- Validate all inputsin 32 of 648, across 24 files
- Validate all external input at the system boundaryin 29 of 648, across 19 files
- Run containers as a non-root userin 28 of 648, across 15 files
- Use httponly secure samesite cookies for sessionsin 26 of 648, across 15 files
- Run dependency audits before every releasein 21 of 648, across 10 files
- Encode output to prevent cross-site scriptingin 21 of 648, across 11 files
- Copy dependencies before source codein 20 of 648, across 9 files
- Store secrets in environment variablesin 20 of 648, across 18 files
Said here and by no other author read
- Verify if a new capability is truly required
- Search for candidates via the capability-manager
- Stage and statically scan the candidate
- Run independent security review via security-gatekeeper
- Run sandbox evaluation via core eval
- Run promotion policy via core promote
Grouped from the skills themselves: near-identical wordings counted once, and counted by distinct author, so one author publishing three of these counts once. Length counted with cl100k_base; the agent that loads this file may tokenize it differently.