Security review
Skill ahtishamshahzad/agent_dev_flow/.ai/skills/security-review
Tool-neutral AI Engineering System: 174 reusable skills (installable as Claude Code plugins) for planning and building software with AI agents. Classify → plan → approve → build under quality gates. Works with Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot & Antigravity. Canonical in .ai/.
npx -y skills add ahtishamshahzad/agent_dev_flow --skill security-reviewAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
2 things to look at
- 21 days oldThe repository was created 21 days ago. New is not bad, but a brand new repository carrying a familiar-sounding name is the shape a typosquat arrives in, and there has been no time for anyone else to find a problem with it.
- 0 stars0 stars. Stars are a popularity signal and not a quality one, but at this level it is likely that nobody has read this closely except its author, and you would be relying on your own review.
What its author says it does
Copied from the file, not written here
Use to assess a change or codebase for security weaknesses — secrets, auth, authorization/IDOR, injection, PII handling, transport/errors, payments, and production hardening. Reports findings by severity, separates confirmed from potential, never prints secret values, and never claims "secure."
SKILL.md
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Security Review
Purpose
Find real, exploitable security weaknesses and report them safely. Implements ../../system/SECURITY_RULES.md. Supports Gate 6 and any security-audit request.
When to Use
- Before merge/release for changes touching auth, data, payments, or external input.
- For a security audit request type.
- Whenever an audit or review surfaces a security-relevant surface.
Inputs
- The change/codebase in scope and how it handles secrets, auth, data.
- Whether the app handles money or sensitive PII.
Discovery Questions
- Does the change touch secrets, auth, authorization, input handling, PII, or payments?
- Is this pre-launch, live, or post-incident?
- What is the trust boundary and the data sensitivity?
Responsibilities
Assess, per ../../system/SECURITY_RULES.md:
- Secrets (no hardcoding; git history; client-exposed prefixes; correct key placement).
- Auth (enforced routes, JWT/session integrity, reset flow, rate limits, no default admin).
- Authorization/IDOR (ownership checks, server-side roles, tenant scoping).
- Input/injection (parameterized queries, XSS, command, uploads, validation).
- PII (minimized in logs/third-party; deletion path).
- Transport/errors (TLS, CORS, security headers, generic errors).
- Payments (server-side totals, webhook signatures, abuse) when applicable.
- Production hardening (debug/test endpoints, env fail-fast, dependency advisories).
Report findings with severity and Confirmed vs Potential.
Required Workflow
- Scope to the change/surface + data sensitivity.
- Walk the relevant security areas.
- Run available tools where possible; quote or mark "unverified until run."
- Record findings (severity, Confirmed/Potential,
file:line, redacted). - List secrets to rotate; recommend human review for money/PII at scale.
Decision Rules
- Never print a discovered secret's value — report location/type, redacted, and flag for rotation.
- Separate Confirmed from Potential; assign severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low).
- Block release on open Critical/High confirmed issues.
- Never claim "secure"; report what was checked and fixed, and what needs human review.
Rules
- Do no harm: no data exfiltration, no hitting production/third-party systems, no destructive commands.
- Do not weaken existing controls to "make it work."
- Recommend a professional human review for real money / sensitive PII at scale.
Anti-Patterns
- Printing secret values in the report.
- Claiming the app is "secure."
- Inflating potential findings into confirmed.
- Skipping a check "to save time/tokens."
Validation Checklist
- Relevant security areas assessed.
- Findings: severity + Confirmed/Potential + redacted location.
- Secrets-to-rotate list produced.
- Tools run or unrun checks flagged.
- Human-review recommendation where warranted.
- No secret values printed; no "secure" claim.
Definition of Done
A security review report with severity-rated, Confirmed/Potential findings (secrets redacted), a rotation list, verification notes, and — for money/PII-at-scale — a human-review recommendation.
Related Skills
code-review, dependency-audit, environment-audit, ai-output-review, final-quality-audit, release-planning, project-orchestrator.
Related Knowledge
../../knowledge/ (data model, trust boundaries).
Related References
../../references/security/ (if present) for baselines.
Context Loading Guidance
- Requires: the security-relevant surface, data-sensitivity context.
- Does not require: unrelated modules, the full reference tree, planning skills.
- May load:
dependency-audit,environment-auditfor exposure. - Stop when: the report (with rotation list) is delivered.
Token Efficiency Guidance
Focus on entry points, auth, data access, and config. Quote decisive lines, redacted; don't paste whole files or any secret value.