Desktop security electron

Electron Security & Fuses

Quick Guide: Electron fuses are compile-time security flags flipped via @electron/fuses before code signing. Disable RunAsNode, EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable, EnableNodeCliInspectArguments, and GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges. Enable EnableCookieEncryption, EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation, and OnlyLoadAppFromAsar. Rely on secure defaults: contextIsolation: true (Electron 12+), sandbox: true (Electron 20+), nodeIntegration: false (Electron 5+). Set a restrictive Content Security Policy. Use setPermissionRequestHandler to deny all permissions except an explicit allowlist. Block navigation and new-window creation.

---

<critical_requirements>

CRITICAL: Before Using This Skill

All code must follow project conventions in CLAUDE.md (kebab-case, named exports, import ordering, import type, named constants)

(You MUST flip fuses BEFORE code signing -- the OS enforces fuse state after signing, so flipping after signing invalidates the signature)

(You MUST disable RunAsNode, EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable, EnableNodeCliInspectArguments, and GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges fuses in production builds -- these are the most commonly exploited attack vectors)

(You MUST enable both EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation AND OnlyLoadAppFromAsar together -- enabling integrity validation alone still allows bypassing via the app code search path)

(You MUST NOT override security defaults (contextIsolation: true, sandbox: true, nodeIntegration: false) -- each one unlocks a critical attack surface)

(You MUST restrict permissions via session.setPermissionRequestHandler() -- Electron grants most permissions by default, including camera, microphone, and geolocation)

</critical_requirements>

---

Auto-detection: Electron fuses, @electron/fuses, FuseV1Options, FuseVersion, flipFuses, RunAsNode, EnableCookieEncryption, EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation, OnlyLoadAppFromAsar, GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges, ASAR integrity, Electron security, contextIsolation, sandbox, nodeIntegration, webPreferences security, Content-Security-Policy, setPermissionRequestHandler, setPermissionCheckHandler, will-navigate, setWindowOpenHandler, shell.openExternal validation, deep link validation, registerSchemesAsPrivileged, ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE, NODE_OPTIONS

When to use:

• Configuring Electron fuses for production builds
• Setting up ASAR integrity validation
• Hardening webPreferences and sandbox settings
• Defining Content Security Policy for renderer HTML
• Restricting permissions, navigation, and new-window creation
• Validating deep link / custom protocol URLs
• Securing shell.openExternal() calls
• Auditing an Electron app's security posture

When NOT to use:

• General Electron architecture (main/renderer process model, IPC patterns, app lifecycle)
• Packaging and distribution (Electron Forge, Electron Builder setup)
• Native OS API integration (dialogs, menus, tray, notifications)
• Choosing a UI framework for the renderer window

Key patterns covered:

• Fuse configuration with @electron/fuses (all 9 fuses explained)
• ASAR integrity validation (macOS + Windows, required fuses, tooling support)
• Secure webPreferences defaults and audit pattern
• Content Security Policy (meta tag and session headers)
• Permission request/check handlers with allowlists
• Navigation and new-window restriction
• shell.openExternal() URL validation
• Custom protocol security and deep link validation
• file:// protocol replacement with custom schemes

---

<philosophy>

Philosophy

Electron security follows a defense-in-depth strategy: multiple independent layers each reduce attack surface, so a breach in one layer does not compromise the entire app.

The layers from outermost to innermost:

1. Fuses -- compile-time flags that remove features from the binary entirely (cannot be re-enabled at runtime)
2. ASAR integrity -- ensures packaged app code has not been tampered with
3. Process sandbox -- OS-level isolation restricting what renderer processes can access
4. Context isolation -- separates preload script scope from renderer globals
5. Content Security Policy -- restricts what the renderer can load and execute
6. Permission handlers -- explicit allowlist for web API permissions
7. Navigation restrictions -- prevent renderers from leaving the app's origin
8. Input validation -- treat all IPC messages and URLs as untrusted

Key principle: Never rely on a single security mechanism. Each layer handles a different class of attack. Fuses stop living-off-the-land attacks. Sandboxing stops renderer-to-OS escalation. CSP stops code injection. Permission handlers stop unauthorized API access.

When to use this skill:

• Preparing an Electron app for production distribution
• Responding to a security audit or penetration test
• Configuring build tooling to flip fuses and enable ASAR integrity
• Reviewing webPreferences, CSP, and permission handling

When NOT to use:

• Initial app scaffolding (set up the app first, then harden)
• Debugging IPC or window management (not a security concern)
• Styling or UI framework decisions

</philosophy>

---

<patterns>

Core Patterns

Pattern 1: Fuse Configuration

Fuses are compile-time feature toggles embedded in the Electron binary. Once flipped and code-signed, the OS prevents reversal. Use the @electron/fuses package to flip them during your build step.

// build-scripts/flip-fuses.js
const { flipFuses, FuseVersion, FuseV1Options } = require("@electron/fuses");

await flipFuses(
  // Path to your packaged Electron binary
  require("electron"),
  {
    version: FuseVersion.V1,
    [FuseV1Options.RunAsNode]: false,
    [FuseV1Options.EnableCookieEncryption]: true,
    [FuseV1Options.EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable]: false,
    [FuseV1Options.EnableNodeCliInspectArguments]: false,
    [FuseV1Options.EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation]: true,
    [FuseV1Options.OnlyLoadAppFromAsar]: true,
    [FuseV1Options.LoadBrowserProcessSpecificV8Snapshot]: false,
    [FuseV1Options.GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges]: false,
  },
);

Why these settings: Disabling RunAsNode prevents ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE living-off-the-land attacks. Disabling GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges removes file:// fetch/frame escalation. Enabling cookie encryption and ASAR integrity adds tamper protection. See examples/core.md for the full fuse reference table and integration with Electron Forge and electron-builder.

---

Pattern 2: ASAR Integrity Validation

ASAR integrity ensures the packaged app.asar has not been tampered with. Requires two fuses enabled together.

Fuse	Purpose
EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation	Validates the ASAR header hash at runtime
OnlyLoadAppFromAsar	Prevents loading app code from outside the ASAR archive

Platform support: macOS (Electron 16+), Windows (Electron 30+).

Key point: Electron Forge (7.4.0+) and @electron/packager (18.3.1+) automatically generate the integrity metadata when ASAR is enabled. Electron Builder supports it via the electronFuses config or afterPack hook. If only EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation is enabled without OnlyLoadAppFromAsar, an attacker can place a plain app folder alongside the ASAR and bypass validation entirely.

See examples/core.md for platform-specific configuration details.

---

Pattern 3: Secure webPreferences Defaults

Modern Electron (v20+) defaults to the secure configuration. Never override these defaults.

const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
  webPreferences: {
    preload: path.join(__dirname, "preload.js"),
    // All of these are DEFAULTS -- do NOT set them explicitly unless
    // you need to verify them in a security audit
    // contextIsolation: true   -- Electron 12+
    // sandbox: true            -- Electron 20+
    // nodeIntegration: false   -- Electron 5+
    // webSecurity: true        -- always
  },
});

Why good: Relying on defaults means future Electron upgrades automatically apply new secure defaults. Explicitly setting values can mask future changes.

// BAD -- overriding secure defaults
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
  webPreferences: {
    contextIsolation: false, // exposes preload scope to renderer
    nodeIntegration: true, // gives renderer full Node.js access
    sandbox: false, // disables OS-level process isolation
  },
});

Why bad: Each override removes a security layer. contextIsolation: false lets renderer code access preload globals. nodeIntegration: true gives the renderer fs, child_process, and every Node.js API. sandbox: false removes OS-level process isolation.

See examples/core.md for the development-only audit pattern that catches accidental overrides.

---

Pattern 4: Content Security Policy

Set CSP to restrict what the renderer can load and execute. Use the <meta> tag for static apps or session headers for dynamic CSP.

<!-- index.html -- static CSP -->
<meta
  http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
  content="
    default-src 'self';
    script-src 'self';
    style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
    img-src 'self' data:;
    connect-src 'self';
    font-src 'self';
  "
/>

Key point: 'self' restricts loading to the app's own origin. Never add 'unsafe-eval' in production -- it enables eval() and template injection attacks. See examples/csp-permissions.md for session header CSP and development-specific overrides.

---

Pattern 5: Permission Handling

By default, Electron grants most web API permissions (camera, microphone, geolocation, notifications). Use an explicit allowlist to deny everything else.

const ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS = new Set([
  "clipboard-read",
  "clipboard-sanitized-write",
]);

session.defaultSession.setPermissionRequestHandler(
  (_webContents, permission, callback) => {
    callback(ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS.has(permission));
  },
);

session.defaultSession.setPermissionCheckHandler((_webContents, permission) => {
  return ALLOWED_PERMISSIONS.has(permission);
});

Why both handlers: setPermissionRequestHandler handles async permission requests (prompted). setPermissionCheckHandler handles synchronous permission queries (silent checks). Without both, some permissions can slip through. See examples/csp-permissions.md for extended examples.

---

Pattern 6: Navigation and New-Window Restrictions

Prevent the renderer from navigating to unexpected URLs or opening new windows.

// Block navigation away from the app
mainWindow.webContents.on("will-navigate", (event, url) => {
  const appUrl = mainWindow.webContents.getURL();
  if (url !== appUrl) {
    event.preventDefault();
  }
});

// Block new window creation -- open external links in default browser
mainWindow.webContents.setWindowOpenHandler(({ url }) => {
  const parsed = new URL(url);
  if (parsed.protocol === "https:") {
    shell.openExternal(url);
  }
  return { action: "deny" };
});

Why critical: Without these guards, a compromised renderer could navigate to a phishing page styled to look like your app, or spawn pop-up windows. setWindowOpenHandler replaces the deprecated new-window event. See examples/navigation-protocols.md for complete patterns.

---

Pattern 7: Deep Link and Custom Protocol Security

Custom protocols (myapp://) replace file:// for serving local content and handling deep links. Always validate incoming URLs.

protocol.registerSchemesAsPrivileged([
  {
    scheme: "myapp",
    privileges: { standard: true, secure: true, supportFetchAPI: true },
  },
]);

Key point: secure: true makes the scheme behave like https: for CSP and mixed-content checks. Deep link URLs must be parsed and validated before acting on them -- an attacker can craft arbitrary myapp:// URLs to trigger unintended actions. Disable GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges fuse and serve content via your custom protocol instead of file://.

See examples/navigation-protocols.md for deep link validation, safe shell.openExternal(), and custom protocol handler patterns.

</patterns>

---

<decision_framework>

Decision Framework

Fuse Selection

For each fuse, decide based on your app's needs:

RunAsNode
+-- Does your app need ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE?
|   +-- YES (rare -- testing tools only) --> Leave enabled
|   +-- NO (most apps) --> Disable (prevents living-off-the-land attacks)

EnableCookieEncryption
+-- Does your app store cookies?
|   +-- YES --> Enable (one-way transition -- cannot decrypt after enabling)
|   +-- NO --> Enable anyway (no downside, protects future use)

EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable
+-- Does your production app need NODE_OPTIONS?
|   +-- YES (extremely rare) --> Leave enabled
|   +-- NO --> Disable (prevents env-var code injection)

EnableNodeCliInspectArguments
+-- Does your production app need --inspect?
|   +-- YES (never in production) --> Leave enabled only for dev builds
|   +-- NO --> Disable (prevents debugger attachment)

EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation
+-- Is your app packaged as ASAR?
|   +-- YES --> Enable (ALWAYS pair with OnlyLoadAppFromAsar)
|   +-- NO --> Not applicable

OnlyLoadAppFromAsar
+-- Is ASAR integrity validation enabled?
|   +-- YES --> Enable (prevents bypass via unpacked app folder)
|   +-- NO --> Enable anyway (prevents loading tampered code)

GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges
+-- Does your app serve content via file:// protocol?
|   +-- YES --> Migrate to custom protocol, then disable
|   +-- NO --> Disable (removes file:// fetch and frame escalation)

CSP Strategy

What content does your renderer load?
+-- Only local files (bundled with app)?
|   +-- Use: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'
+-- Local files + CDN assets?
|   +-- Use: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' https://cdn.example.com
+-- Remote content (web app in a window)?
|   +-- Use: restrictive CSP + sandbox: true + disable nodeIntegration
+-- Dev server with HMR?
    +-- Use: relaxed CSP in dev only, strict in production

</decision_framework>

---

Detailed resources:

• examples/core.md -- Fuse reference table, ASAR integrity, webPreferences audit, fuse integration with build tools
• examples/csp-permissions.md -- Content Security Policy, permission handlers, session-level security
• examples/navigation-protocols.md -- Navigation restrictions, deep link validation, custom protocols, shell.openExternal
• reference.md -- Security checklist, fuse defaults table, version history

---

<red_flags>

RED FLAGS

Critical Security Issues:

• Disabling contextIsolation (contextIsolation: false) -- exposes preload globals to renderer, enabling full preload scope access from untrusted code
• Enabling nodeIntegration: true -- gives renderer full Node.js access (fs, child_process, net), equivalent to giving a web page OS-level control
• Not flipping fuses before code signing -- fuses must be flipped before signing or the signature is invalidated; flipping after signing breaks the app on macOS
• Enabling EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation WITHOUT OnlyLoadAppFromAsar -- attacker can bypass validation by placing an app folder next to the ASAR
• Leaving RunAsNode enabled in production -- allows ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 /path/to/your/app malicious-script.js to execute arbitrary code
• Leaving GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges enabled when not using file:// -- grants file:// pages fetch access and universal frame access unnecessarily
• Passing unvalidated URLs to shell.openExternal() -- can execute arbitrary commands via file:// or custom protocol URLs

Medium Priority Issues:

• Missing Content-Security-Policy in renderer HTML -- XSS attacks can inject and execute arbitrary scripts
• No setPermissionRequestHandler -- Electron grants camera, microphone, geolocation by default
• Not blocking navigation (will-navigate unhandled) -- renderer can navigate to phishing pages
• Using 'unsafe-eval' in CSP -- enables eval(), new Function(), and template injection
• Disabling webSecurity in production (webSecurity: false) -- disables same-origin policy entirely
• Setting allowRunningInsecureContent: true -- allows HTTP content on HTTPS pages

Gotchas & Edge Cases:

• Cookie encryption is a one-way transition -- once enabled, existing unencrypted cookies become unreadable; plan migration carefully
• ASAR integrity is not encryption -- it prevents tampering but a determined attacker can extract, modify, and repackage; keep sensitive logic server-side
• setPermissionCheckHandler and setPermissionRequestHandler serve different purposes -- you need both for complete coverage (sync checks vs async requests)
• setWindowOpenHandler replaces the deprecated new-window event -- using the old event does nothing in recent Electron versions
• Development CSP may need 'unsafe-inline' for bundler-injected scripts -- scope this to dev builds only, never ship it
• strictlyRequireAllFuses: true in @electron/fuses will fail if a new fuse is added in a future Electron version and you haven't configured it -- useful for staying current but breaks builds on Electron upgrades until you update config
• resetAdHocDarwinSignature must be true for arm64 macOS builds when not immediately code-signing afterward -- without it, the app fails to launch on Apple Silicon
• ASAR integrity validation on Windows requires Electron 30+ -- earlier versions only support macOS

</red_flags>

---

<critical_reminders>

CRITICAL REMINDERS

All code must follow project conventions in CLAUDE.md (kebab-case, named exports, import ordering, import type, named constants)

(You MUST flip fuses BEFORE code signing -- the OS enforces fuse state after signing, so flipping after signing invalidates the signature)

(You MUST disable RunAsNode, EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable, EnableNodeCliInspectArguments, and GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges fuses in production builds -- these are the most commonly exploited attack vectors)

(You MUST enable both EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation AND OnlyLoadAppFromAsar together -- enabling integrity validation alone still allows bypassing via the app code search path)

(You MUST NOT override security defaults (contextIsolation: true, sandbox: true, nodeIntegration: false) -- each one unlocks a critical attack surface)

(You MUST restrict permissions via session.setPermissionRequestHandler() -- Electron grants most permissions by default, including camera, microphone, and geolocation)

Failure to follow these rules will create exploitable security vulnerabilities in your Electron application.

</critical_reminders>