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Detecting dll sideloading attacks

Skill adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/cursor-claude-codex/skills/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

Detect DLL side-loading attacks where adversaries place malicious DLLs alongside legitimate applications to hijack execution flow for defense evasion.From its SKILL.md

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SKILL.md

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Detecting DLL Sideloading Attacks

When to Use

  • When investigating potential DLL hijacking in enterprise environments
  • After EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs loaded by signed applications
  • When hunting for APT persistence using legitimate application wrappers
  • During incident response to identify trojanized applications
  • When threat intel indicates DLL sideloading campaigns targeting specific software

Prerequisites

  • EDR with DLL load monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
  • Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) with hash verification
  • Application whitelisting or DLL integrity monitoring
  • Software inventory of legitimate applications and expected DLL paths
  • Code signing verification capabilities

Workflow

  1. Identify Sideloading Targets: Research known vulnerable applications that load DLLs without full path qualification (LOLBAS, DLL-sideload databases).
  2. Monitor DLL Load Events: Query Sysmon Event ID 7 for DLL loads where the DLL path differs from the application's expected directory.
  3. Check DLL Signatures: Flag unsigned or untrusted DLLs loaded by signed executables.
  4. Detect Path Anomalies: Identify legitimate executables running from unusual locations (Temp, AppData, Public) that may be decoy wrappers.
  5. Hash Verification: Compare loaded DLL hashes against known-good versions and threat intel feeds.
  6. Correlate with Process Behavior: Check if the host process exhibits unusual behavior (network connections, child processes) after loading the suspicious DLL.
  7. Document and Remediate: Report sideloading instances, quarantine malicious DLLs, and update detection rules.

Key Concepts

ConceptDescription
T1574.002DLL Side-Loading
T1574.001DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1574.006Dynamic Linker Hijacking
T1574.008Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
DLL Search OrderWindows DLL loading priority path
Side-LoadingPlacing malicious DLL where legitimate app loads it
Phantom DLLDLL that legitimate apps try to load but does not exist
DLL ProxyingMalicious DLL forwarding calls to legitimate DLL

Tools & Systems

ToolPurpose
SysmonEvent ID 7 DLL load monitoring
CrowdStrike FalconDLL load detection with process context
Microsoft Defender for EndpointDLL load anomaly detection
Process MonitorReal-time DLL load tracing
DLL Export ViewerVerify DLL export functions
SigcheckDigital signature verification
pe-sievePE analysis for proxied DLLs

Common Scenarios

  1. Legitimate App Wrapper: Adversary copies signed application (e.g., OneDrive updater) to temp folder alongside malicious DLL with same name as expected dependency.
  2. Phantom DLL Exploitation: Malicious DLL placed in PATH location where legitimate app searches for non-existent DLL.
  3. DLL Proxy Loading: Malicious version.dll proxies all exports to real version.dll while executing malicious code on DllMain.
  4. Software Update Hijack: Attacker replaces DLL in update staging directory before legitimate updater loads it.

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-SIDELOAD-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1574.002
Host Application: [Legitimate signed executable]
Sideloaded DLL: [Malicious DLL name and path]
Expected DLL Path: [Where DLL should legitimately be]
DLL Signed: [Yes/No]
App Location: [Expected/Anomalous]
Host: [Hostname]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

What ships with it: 5 files

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