Setup permissions
Skill ada-ggf25/AI-Tools/global/codex/skills/setup-permissions
A cross-device synced catalog for Claude and Codex skills, agents, and workflows.
npx -y skills add ada-ggf25/AI-Tools --skill setup-permissionsAssembled from the repository path, not quoted from the project. Check it against their README if it does not work.
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What its author says it does
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Scan the current repository's stack and propose scoped Codex sandbox, trust, and command-approval guidance for common test, lint, build, package, git, and external-tool workflows. Writes only after explicit approval. Global and project-agnostic. Trigger when the user says "set up permissions", "setup-permissions", "configure Codex permissions for this repo", "what permissions do I need", "allowlist commands for this project", or "configure Codex approvals".
SKILL.md
3.3 KB, 647 tokens by cl100k_base, as published. Nobody here has run it
Set Up Codex Permissions
Review the repo and propose narrow Codex permission/config guidance before the user hits repeated approval prompts. Treat permissions and sandbox settings as a security boundary.
Targets
Prefer the least invasive target:
- Project guidance in
AGENTS.md: default for documenting commands that should be run and which ones need care. - Project trust in
~/.codex/config.toml: only if the user explicitly wants this repo trusted and understands it is personal machine config. - Codex hooks or plugin config: only for deterministic automation that should always run.
- Global config: only for genuinely global, user-approved behavior.
Do not silently edit ~/.codex/config.toml; show the exact change first.
Rule Of Thumb
Propose narrow, frequent, low-risk operations. Do not propose broad or destructive allows.
Good examples:
- test commands from project manifests;
- lint/format commands;
- build/type-check commands;
- read-only
ghstatus and PR inspection; - scoped package manager commands that do not publish or mutate global state.
Do not propose:
rm,sudo, force-push, destructive git reset/checkout, deploys, releases, publish commands, secret reads,.envreads, orcurl ... | sh;- broad shell rules that would cover unrelated commands.
Procedure
1. Orient
- Read existing
AGENTS.md,.codex/,.agents/, README, and manifests. - Check whether the repo is already trusted in
~/.codex/config.tomlif local access is available. - Do not treat Claude
.claude/settings*.jsonpermission rules as Codex config; use them only as hints about repeated workflows.
2. Scan The Stack
Read manifests/configs such as package.json, pyproject.toml, Makefile, justfile,
go.mod, Cargo.toml, CI workflows, lint/format config, and test config.
Identify:
- test runner;
- linter/formatter/type checker;
- build tool;
- package manager;
- GitHub/GitLab/other external tooling;
- commands likely to need network or writes outside the workspace.
3. Propose
Group proposals by category: tests, lint/format, build/type-check, package management, git/GitHub, local tools, and documentation.
For each proposal include:
- command or config change;
- target location;
- what it enables;
- what it deliberately does not enable.
Include a "Deliberately not proposed" section for dangerous operations withheld.
4. Write Only Approved Changes
After explicit approval, apply only the selected changes. Preserve existing config and dedupe entries. If the approved change is global/personal config, make the scope obvious in the final report.
Guardrails
- Proposal first, write second.
- Never silently edit global Codex config.
- Never propose broad shell or destructive permissions.
- Merge, never clobber.
- Base every proposed command on files observed in the repo.
What ships with it
Read from the repository
Just SKILL.md. No reference files, no scripts.