Acuris eudi

Overview

The Acuris EUDI Verifier is a hosted OID4VP (OpenID for Verifiable Presentations) relying-party service at https://eudi.acuris-geo.com. It accepts EU Digital Identity Wallet presentations of the PID (Personal Identification Data) credential (SD-JWT VC format), validates the credential against the EU 27 member-state Trusted Lists (LOTL → national TSL → x5c chain → CRL), and cross-checks the disclosed residence address against Acuris's address-validation pipeline.

This skill teaches AI assistants how to integrate the verifier as a relying party (RP) — typically a bank, fintech, or branch-onboarding backend that needs to verify a customer's residence address via their EUDI Wallet rather than via document upload.

You — the integrator — do not implement the wallet side. Your backend initiates a verification session, displays a QR code (or deep link) to the user, and polls for the verification result. The wallet posts the presentation directly to the Acuris verifier. The Acuris verifier validates trust + address and returns a structured result to your backend.

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the user is:

• Wiring an EUDI Wallet verification step into a bank KYC, branch onboarding, account-opening, or address-change flow.
• Building a relying-party backend that calls POST /v1/eudi/sessions to start a verification and GET /v1/eudi/sessions/<id>/result to poll for the answer.
• Generating an OID4VP presentation_definition for the address-only field set Acuris supports.
• Interpreting verification_status, credential_validity, accuracy_type, and skipped_reason in poll responses.
• Wiring the QR-code / deep-link presentation to the user (typically inside a branch tablet, a teller app, or a mobile onboarding flow).
• Asking about EU 27 trust validation, qualified electronic signatures, or which member-state TSLs are currently loaded.

Do NOT use this skill for:

• Issuing PID credentials. Issuance is a member-state operation (in Germany, by Bundesdruckerei) — Acuris is verifier-side only.
• General-purpose KYC checks beyond address (sanctions screening, PEP check, source-of-funds verification). Acuris EUDI does not cover identity attribute validation beyond passing identity claims through; layer a dedicated KYC vendor for those.
• Pure address validation without EUDI Wallet (use the acuris-address skill instead — the underlying AV pipeline is the same, but you don't need OID4VP if the user is just typing).
• Non-EU identity wallets (mDL / ISO 18013-5, U.S. state mobile DLs, W3C DIDs without OID4VP). Out of scope.

Integration shape at a glance

You implement two HTTP calls. The wallet handles everything in between.

        ┌──────────────┐
        │ Your backend │
        └──────┬───────┘
               │ 1. POST /v1/eudi/sessions
               │    → returns session_id + presentation_uri + qr_code_data_url
               ▼
        ┌──────────────┐
        │ Your UI      │  shows QR / deep link to user
        └──────┬───────┘
               │ user scans → wallet opens → consents to disclosure
               ▼
        ┌──────────────┐
        │ EUDI Wallet  │  fetches presentation_definition, builds VP
        │ (user device)│  POSTs vp_token → /v1/eudi/callback
        └──────┬───────┘
               │
               ▼  (Acuris verifier validates trust + address)
        ┌──────────────┐
        │ Your backend │  2. GET /v1/eudi/sessions/<id>/result
        │              │     → poll until verification_status != "pending"
        └──────────────┘

You poll the result endpoint; the wallet → verifier handshake is opaque to you. Typical end-to-end time: 5-30 seconds depending on how long the user takes to consent.

API endpoints you actually call

Endpoint	Method	Who calls it
POST /v1/eudi/sessions	POST	Your backend — start a session
GET /v1/eudi/sessions/{session_id}/result	GET	Your backend — poll for result
GET /v1/eudi/healthz	GET	Your monitoring
GET /v1/eudi/.well-known/openid-credential-verifier	GET	Wallets — verifier metadata
POST /v1/eudi/callback	POST	The wallet — do not call this yourself
GET /v1/eudi/presentation-definition/{id}	GET	The wallet — do not call this yourself

The last two are documented for completeness; relying parties do not implement against them. They're the wallet's view of the verifier.

Detailed shapes for every endpoint are in references/api-reference.md.

Quick start

# 1. Start a session
SID=$(curl -s -X POST https://eudi.acuris-geo.com/v1/eudi/sessions \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "customer_id": "kyc-2026-12345",
    "requested_fields": [
      "resident_country", "resident_city", "resident_postal_code",
      "resident_street", "resident_house_number"
    ]
  }' | jq -r .session_id)

# 2. Render the returned qr_code_data_url or presentation_uri in your UI.
#    User scans → wallet opens → consents.

# 3. Poll
while true; do
  RESULT=$(curl -s https://eudi.acuris-geo.com/v1/eudi/sessions/$SID/result)
  STATUS=$(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r .verification_status)
  [ "$STATUS" != "pending" ] && break
  sleep 2
done
echo "$RESULT" | jq .

verification_status ends in one of: valid, invalid, expired. Each carries different metadata; full handling in references/result-handling.md.

Defaults

• Production base URL: https://eudi.acuris-geo.com. There is no separate sandbox host; pilots use a customer_id prefix Acuris hands out (e.g. pilot-acme-…).
• Address-only disclosure. The Acuris verifier whitelist accepts three identity claims (given_name, family_name, birth_date) alongside six resident_* address sub-fields, but only the resident_* fields are cross-checked against Acuris reference data. Requesting non-whitelisted fields silently drops them (and logs the drop in your audit trail). See references/field-disclosure.md.
• Polling, not webhooks. Phase 2 ships polling-only. The callback_url field on POST /v1/eudi/sessions is reserved for Phase 3 webhook delivery and is currently ignored. Build your integration to poll the polling_url returned in the session response.
• Session TTL: 10 minutes. A session that hasn't received a callback within 10 minutes flips to expired. Per-session TTL is configurable in Phase 3.
• Don't echo the nonce. The session response deliberately omits the OID4VP nonce as a top-level field; banks have no need for it and exposing it widens the replay-attack surface. It's embedded inside presentation_uri if you need it for debugging.
• mTLS for bank pilots. Phase 2 supports per-pilot mTLS on the bank-facing endpoints. Default is unauthenticated; mTLS provisioning is per-pilot. See references/mtls-bank-pilot.md.

Common mistakes

1. Calling /v1/eudi/callback from your backend. That endpoint is for the user's wallet only. Your backend uses session-start + result-poll; the wallet handles the direct_post between them.

2. Polling too aggressively. A 2-second poll interval is fine. A 100ms interval will rate-limit you and won't return results faster — the bottleneck is the user's consent flow, which takes seconds.

3. Treating verification_status: "pending" as an error. It means "the wallet hasn't called us back yet." Keep polling until valid, invalid, or expired.

4. Requesting identity claims you don't need. Selective disclosure is the whole point of EUDI Wallet. Requesting only the address sub-fields builds user trust and matches what the verifier actually validates. Asking for given_name or family_name along with the address is permitted but the verifier only address-cross-checks, not identity-cross-checks.

5. Ignoring skipped_reason. When AV cross-reference doesn't run (e.g. partial disclosure, AV transport error), the poll response includes a skipped_reason string. Treat that as a first-class outcome to log and surface to the bank operator — it isn't an error per se.

6. Confusing accuracy_type semantics with the AV-only ones. In EUDI responses, accuracy_type is one of Verified, Corrected, Partial, Unverified — a four-bucket projection of the underlying Acuris cascade tuned for KYC compliance reasoning. See references/result-handling.md.

7. Not handling country_code outside EUDI Wallet scope. EUDI Wallet is currently EU 27 + EEA non-EU. A disclosed resident_country outside this scope returns accuracy_type: "Unverified" with a skipped_reason of country code not supported by EUDI Wallet scope (alpha-2: XX). Surface this to the user — it isn't a bug in your code or theirs.

Implementation patterns

Detailed recipes live in the references. Load whichever matches the task:

• Backend relying-party integration (Node, Python, Go)
• Full session lifecycle: states, polling cadence, expiry, error recovery
• What the wallet does (read-only for context, not for implementation)
• Field disclosure and the address whitelist
• Result handling: accuracy_type, credential_validity, skipped_reason
• Trust model: LOTL, member-state TSLs, OJ anchors, CRL checks
• mTLS bank pilots

Trust model in one paragraph

The verifier walks every presented SD-JWT VC's x5c chain up to a root, then verifies that root against the issuing member state's national TSL (Trusted List), then verifies the TSL's signature against the EU LOTL (List of Trusted Lists), then verifies the LOTL's signature against the pinned OJ (Official Journal) trust anchors. Six OJ anchors are pinned for rotation resilience. The leaf issuer certificate's CRL is checked too. If any link breaks, the response status is invalid and credential_validity.signature_valid or .issuer_trusted will be false. Full mechanics in references/trust-model.md.

Additional resources

• Live verifier metadata: https://eudi.acuris-geo.com/v1/eudi/.well-known/openid-credential-verifier
• Health check: https://eudi.acuris-geo.com/v1/eudi/healthz
• OID4VP spec: https://openid.net/specs/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-1_0.html
• SD-JWT VC spec: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc/
• EU LOTL: https://ec.europa.eu/tools/lotl/eu-lotl.xml
• Acuris pricing & EUDI pilot enquiries: https://acuris-geo.com/