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Incident retro workflow

Skill 2702207741-dev/agent-skills-pipeline/incident-retro-workflow

Governed, replay-tested agent skills for Codex-style maintainer workflows.

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Use when the user asks to write, review, analyze, or improve an incident retro, postmortem, outage review, rollback review, timeline, impact summary, RCA, factor analysis, or corrective action plan after an incident, customer-impacting bug, deploy failure, data issue, or security-adjacent event.

SKILL.md

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Incident Retro Workflow

Overview

Incident retros turn painful evidence into safer systems. Build a sourced timeline, quantify impact, separate triggers from factors, and create verified actions that reduce recurrence, detection time, or response time.

When to Use

Use WhenDon't Use When
The user says "incident retro", "postmortem", "outage review", "rollback review", "RCA", "timeline", or "corrective actions"The incident is still active and needs mitigation
An incident, customer-impacting bug, deploy failure, data issue, or reliability regression needs analysisA bug has no reproduction or root-cause evidence; use systematic-debugging
Alerts, logs, tickets, deploys, traces, metrics, or chat need to become a factual retroNo artifact, timeline, symptom, or affected behavior exists
Follow-up work needs owners, dates, verification, and risk reductionThe task only adds telemetry; use observability-workflow
A draft retro needs review for blame, unsupported claims, weak actions, or missing impactSecurity, privacy, tenant, abuse, or legal exposure lacks review

Phase 0 Benchmark Decision

Type: Technique with safety judgment. Use blameless habits: facts before interpretation, explicit uncertainty, impact before causes, people-neutral language, and evidence-tied actions.

Retro Gate

Incident active -> no final retro.
No evidence or timeline -> no root-cause claim.
Person-blame language -> rewrite to system/process factors.
No owner/date/verification -> invalid action item.
Security/privacy/legal exposure -> use agent-security-guard.

The Process

stabilize -> evidence -> timeline -> impact -> factors -> actions -> review -> handoff

Step 1: Confirm Stabilization, Scope, and Retro Mode

Expected Output: status=<resolved|mitigated|ongoing>, incident=<name>, severity=<sev>, scope=<systems/users/time>, retro_mode=<draft|final|blocked>

Confirm whether the system is restored, mitigated, or still failing. Name the incident, window, affected systems, audience, and draft/final mode.

git status --short
rg -n "incident|outage|rollback|postmortem|retro|SEV|severity|customer impact|data loss|deploy|runbook|mitigation|resolved" .

Record:

Incident:
Status:
Start/end:
Affected systems/users:
Retro mode:

If fails:

  • status=ongoing -> stop final retro work; produce a containment note.
  • Scope is unclear -> ask for start time, end time, affected system, and user impact.
  • Security, privacy, tenant, abuse, legal, or personnel-sensitive facts appear -> use agent-security-guard.

Step 2: Collect Evidence and Label Confidence

Expected Output: evidence=<logs|metrics|traces|tickets|deploys|chat>, gaps=<list>, confidence=<low|medium|high>

Collect primary artifacts first: alerts, metrics, traces, logs, deploy records, channel timestamps, tickets, status updates, runbooks, commits, and customer reports.

rg -n "error|timeout|exception|rollback|deploy|migration|alert|SLO|SLA|health|metric|trace|log|status page|customer report" .
git log --oneline --decorate -n 30
git diff --name-status

Evidence table:

| Evidence | Source | Timezone | Proves | Confidence |
|----------|--------|----------|--------|------------|

If fails:

  • Only anecdotes exist -> mark confidence=low; do not claim root cause.
  • Evidence conflicts -> keep both versions with source and timestamp.
  • Artifacts contain secrets, PII, customer data, or personnel data -> redact before quoting.

Step 3: Build a Factual Timeline

Expected Output: timeline=<ordered events>, detection=<source>, mitigation=<action>, resolution=<time>, unknowns=<list>

Use absolute timestamps with timezone. Separate detection, acknowledgement, diagnosis, mitigation, recovery, customer communication, and post-recovery checks.

| Time | Event | Source | Confidence |
|------|-------|--------|------------|

Rules:

  • Include detected, acknowledged, mitigation started, mitigated, resolved, and verified.
  • Label inference as inference.
  • Keep unknown time ranges visible.

If fails:

  • Times lack timezone -> ask or label timezone as unknown.
  • Events are out of order -> sort by absolute time and preserve source timestamps.
  • Detection or resolution is missing -> add an open question instead of smoothing the narrative.

Step 4: Quantify Impact and Blast Radius

Expected Output: impact=<users/systems/data/business>, duration=<start/end>, severity=<label>, blast_radius=<scope>

Quantify user harm, data correctness, availability, latency, toil, support load, SLA/SLO effect, and communications. Do not invent numbers.

| Dimension | Value | Evidence | Notes |
|-----------|-------|----------|-------|
| Users affected | <count/percent/unknown> | <source> | <segment> |
| Duration | <start-end> | <source> | <impact window> |
| Data impact | <none/loss/corruption/delay/unknown> | <source> | <status> |
| Business/SLO impact | <value/unknown> | <source> | <breach/no breach> |

If fails:

  • Impact is unknown -> state the missing artifact that would prove it.
  • Severity label conflicts with measured impact -> use measured impact and note mismatch.
  • Data loss, privacy, payment, auth, tenant, or destructive action appears -> use agent-security-guard.

Step 5: Identify Triggers and Contributing Factors

Expected Output: factors=<trigger|latent|detection|response|process|test|observability>, root_cause_claim=<supported|unsupported|not_single>

Prefer contributing factors over a single root cause unless evidence proves one dominant cause.

CategoryQuestion
TriggerWhat changed or happened immediately before impact?
Latent conditionWhat existing weakness made the trigger harmful?
Guardrail gapWhat test, review, deploy gate, flag, or rollback missed it?
Detection gapWhy was it detected then, not earlier?
Response gapWhat slowed mitigation, communication, or recovery?
Ownership gapWhat unclear owner, doc, or decision path mattered?
| Factor | Category | Evidence | Link to impact | Confidence |
|--------|----------|----------|----------------|------------|

If fails:

  • Explanation says "human error" -> rewrite as the system/process condition that allowed the action.
  • Cause is asserted without evidence -> demote to hypothesis and add an open question.
  • Factors point to missing tests or signals -> use test-design-workflow or observability-workflow.

Step 6: Create Corrective Actions with Verification

Expected Output: actions=<owner/due/verification>, prevention=<list>, detection=<list>, response=<list>, residual_risk=<list>

Every action must reduce recurrence, detection time, impact, or response time. Each needs owner, due date, linked factor, and closure proof.

| ID | Action | Type | Owner | Due | Verify | Linked factor |
|----|--------|------|-------|-----|--------|---------------|

Action rules:

  • Use concrete verbs: add, remove, block, alert, test, document, migrate, rehearse, automate.
  • Verify with a test, alert evidence, dashboard query, runbook link, deploy check, review evidence, or dry run.
  • Track residual risk when action is deferred.

If fails:

  • Action has no owner, due date, or verification -> mark invalid and revise.
  • Action says "improve monitoring", "add tests", or "document better" -> convert to exact signal, case, file, runbook, or gate.
  • Action spans teams, releases, or risky sequencing -> use planning-workflow.

Step 7: Review the Retro for Quality and Safety

Expected Output: review=<pass|revise|blocked>, gaps=<list>, safety=<clear|needs-redaction>, confidence=<low|medium|high>

Review before publication. The draft must be factual, blameless, specific, and actionable.

rg -n "blame|fault|careless|negligent|human error|TBD|TODO|unknown|probably|obvious|just add|monitoring later|add tests" .

Checks:

  • Timeline has sources, timestamps, timezone, and unknowns.
  • Impact is quantified or explicitly unknown.
  • Trigger, symptom, factors, and root-cause claims are separated.
  • People are not blame anchors.
  • Actions link to factors and have owner, due date, and verification.
  • Sensitive data is redacted; open questions are separate from conclusions.

If fails:

  • Blame language remains -> rewrite around system condition, decision context, guardrail, or process gap.
  • Unsupported certainty remains -> lower confidence or add evidence.
  • Sensitive facts remain -> redact or route through agent-security-guard.

Step 8: Handoff Follow-up and Learning Loop

Expected Output: status=<ready|with-gaps|blocked>, retro=<summary>, follow_up=<tracking plan>, next_skill=<none|planning|observability|testing|debugging>

Finish with a publishable retro and trackable follow-up.

Incident:
Status:
Impact:
Timeline:
Contributing factors:
What went well:
What went poorly:
Corrective actions:
Open questions:
Residual risk:
Follow-up:
Status: ready=<ready|with-gaps|blocked>
StateMeaning
readyEvidence, timeline, impact, factors, actions, and safety review are complete
with-gapsUnknowns or residual risks are explicit and non-blocking
blockedMissing evidence, active incident, unsafe disclosure, or invalid actions blocks publication

If fails:

  • Follow-up is not trackable -> add owners, dates, and verification artifacts.
  • ready has open blockers -> downgrade to with-gaps or blocked.
  • Actions need implementation sequencing -> use planning-workflow.

Bad/Good Retro Patterns

Pattern 1: Person Blame

Bad: The deployer forgot to update config, causing the outage.

Good: The deploy path allowed config/code drift; no preflight check blocked the incompatible pair.

Pattern 2: Unsupported Root Cause

Bad: Root cause: database overload.

Good: Contributing factor: checkout queries exceeded the pool after migration increased per-request queries from 2 to 9.

Pattern 3: Weak Action Item

Bad: Add monitoring and more tests.

Good: A2: Add checkout 5xx ratio alert, owner=Payments, due=2026-07-15, verify=staging failure injection plus alert evidence.

Rationalization Table

RationalizationWhy it fails
"We already know what happened"Memory loses timestamps, impact, uncertainty, and context.
"It was human error"Human error names a symptom; prevention needs system factors.
"No customer complained"Lack of reports is not proof of no impact.
"Just add monitoring"Monitoring without owner, threshold, runbook, and test is noise.
"Action items can be broad"Broad actions do not close because verification is undefined.

Red Flags

  • You write the story before collecting artifacts.
  • Timeline events lack timezone, source, or confidence.
  • Impact says "minimal" or "no customer impact" without evidence.
  • Root cause is a person, team, deploy, or tool with no latent factor.
  • Actions lack owner, due date, verification, or linked factor.
  • Actions target prevention but ignore detection, mitigation, and response.
  • Open questions are hidden inside conclusions.
  • Sensitive customer, security, personnel, or legal facts appear in the draft.

Common Pitfalls

SymptomRoot causeFix
Retro reads like a storyNarrative was written before artifactsBuild the evidence table and timeline first
Team argues about root causeTrigger, latent condition, and factors were collapsedSplit factors by category and evidence
Action items never closeOwner, due date, and verification were omittedReject actions without all three
Same incident repeatsActions targeted symptoms, not guardrailsLink each action to a factor and risk reduction
Blame hides useful factsPerson-centered language makes disclosure unsafeRewrite around system condition and missing guardrail
No-impact claim is disputedImpact was not reconciledCompare metrics, tickets, status updates, and reports

Verification Checklist

  • Description triggers on retros, postmortems, outage reviews, rollback reviews, timelines, RCA, and corrective actions.
  • Incident status, scope, severity, time window, and retro mode are explicit.
  • Evidence lists sources, timestamps/timezone, facts proved, gaps, and confidence.
  • Timeline includes detection, acknowledgement, mitigation, resolution, verification, and unknowns.
  • Impact quantifies users/systems/data/business/SLO or states exactly what is unknown.
  • Symptoms, trigger, factors, and root-cause claims are separated.
  • Language is blameless and avoids person-centered blame.
  • Actions have owner, due date, verification, linked factor, and action type.
  • Sensitive information is redacted or routed through agent-security-guard.
  • Final status is ready, with-gaps, or blocked with residual risk named.

Interaction with Other Skills

Related SkillTriggerHandoff
systematic-debuggingRoot cause is unknown or speculativeReproduce and isolate before final claims
observability-workflowMissing signals or runbooks contributedConvert detection/triage gaps into signal design
planning-workflowActions span teams, releases, or risky sequencingTurn actions into phases, gates, rollback, and owners
test-design-workflowMissing tests or weak regression coverage contributedDesign success, failure, boundary, and regression tests
code-review-workflowReview missed the failure or follow-up diff needs reviewAudit guardrails, tests, rollback, and signals
agent-security-guardSecurity, privacy, tenant, payment, secrets, legal, or destructive boundaries appearRedact and safety-review before publishing
cross-model-verificationFindings are high-risk, disputed, or low-confidenceReview missing factors and weak actions
requirements-clarifierScope, impact, ownership, or closure criteria are vagueClarify outcome and acceptance criteria

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